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1707 
WITHOUT DOORS:  NATIVE NATIONS AND THE 
CONVENTION 
Mary Sarah Bilder* 
 
Wednesday last arrived in this city, from the Cherokee nation, Mr. 
Alexander Droomgoole, with Sconetoyah, a War Captain, and son to one 
of the principal Chiefs of that nation.  They will leave this place in a few 
days, for New-York, to represent to Congress some grievances, and to 
demand an observance of the Treaty of Hopewell, on the Keowee, which 
they say has been violated and infringed by the lawless and unruly whites 
on the frontiers. 
We are informed that a Choctaw King, and a Chickasaw Chief, are also 
on their way to the New-York, to have a Talk with Congress, and to 
brighten the chain of friendship. 
—Pennsylvania Mercury, June 15, 17871 
INTRODUCTION 
The Constitution’s apparent textual near silence with respect to Native 
Nations is misleading.  As this Article reveals, four representatives of Native 
Nations visited Philadelphia in the summer of 1787.  Their visit ensured that 
the Constitution secured the general government’s treaty authority with 
Native Nations and decisively barred state claims of authority.  But, the visits 
also threatened to disrupt Congress’s passage of the Northwest Ordinance 
and the vision of nationally sanctioned white settlement.  In the process of 
successfully preventing the representatives from reaching Congress, 
Secretary at War Henry Knox developed the central tenets of what would 
 
*  Founders Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.  This Article was prepared for the 
Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on 
October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law.  I am particularly grateful to Colin G. 
Calloway, whom I met at Mount Vernon when I was curious about 1787 visits to Philadelphia.  
Colin wrote, “A delegation of Choctaws led by a chief called Taboca visits Philadelphia and 
NY in the summer of 1787.  There may be more.” Email from Colin G. Calloway, Professor 
of Hist. & Native Am. Stud., Dartmouth Coll., to author (Sept. 16, 2016) (on file with the 
Fordham Law Review).  My thanks to Gregory Ablavsky, Colin G. Calloway, David Nichols, 
Greg O’Brien, Charles Weeks, and the Symposium participants, and in particular, to Avi 
Soifer for his careful reading and suggestions and to Vanessa Bernard and Timothy Conklin 
for reading an early draft.  For assistance with materials, I thank the William L. Clements 
Library at the University of Michigan, the Oklahoma Historical Society, Archivo General de 
Indias, the Mississippi Department of Archives & History, and Laurel Davis, Deena Frazier, 
Helen Lacouture, and Caitlin Ross.   
 
 1. Philadelphia, June 15., PA. MERCURY & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, June 15, 1787. 
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become the George Washington administration’s early Indian policy:  an 
acceptance of Native Nation sovereignty, disapproval of unauthorized white 
encroachment, and an attempt to discourage Native Nations from sending 
additional representatives.  In addition to emphasizing the strong national 
federal government role and Native Nation sovereignty, this history provides 
evidence that the Framers’ generation without doors—outside the 
Convention—critically affected the creation of the Constitution as an 
instrument and a system of government. 
Figure 1:  Back of the State House2 
 
 
I.  A CONSTITUTION OF TREATIES 
On June 18, 1787, four deputies of the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw 
Nations were in Philadelphia.  At the time, their presence was widely 
reported.  They met George Washington and other Philadelphia Convention 
members, as well as congressional delegates and the secretary at war, Henry 
Knox.  Although their visits have received some discussion by historians, 
accounts of the Convention entirely overlook their presence.3 
 
 2. William Russell Birch, Back of the State House, Philadelphia (illustration) (1800). 
 3. See, e.g., COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE INDIAN WORLD OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 306–07 
(2018); STANLEY W. HOIG, THE CHEROKEES AND THEIR CHIEFS:  IN THE WAKE OF EMPIRE 70–
71 (1998); GREG O’BRIEN, CHOCTAWS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE, 1750–1830 (2005); U.S. 
NAT’L PARK SERV., SIGNERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 53 (Robert G. Ferris ed., 1976) (including 
an illustration of a newspaper article); Greg O’Brien, The Conqueror Meets the Unconquered:  
Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-revolutionary Southern Frontier, 67 J.S. HIST. 
39, 67 (2001); Daniel Flaherty, “People to Our Selves”:  Chickasaw Diplomacy and Political 
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The erasure of these deputies has resulted in what is taken to be the relative 
silence of the Convention on the constitutional relationship with Native 
Nations.  The basic components of the Constitution’s drafting history have 
been well documented.4  Historian Francis Paul Prucha, for example, wrote 
that “very little attention was paid to the issue in the Constitutional 
Convention, and there was no extensive statement about Indians in the 
Constitution itself.”5  As legal scholar Gregory Ablavsky recently wrote, 
“[h]istories of the Constitution, even very recent ones, assume this absence 
reflects Indians’ irrelevance, and so almost entirely omit Natives.”6  The 
major treatise about Native Nations covers the Convention in one paragraph.7  
The absence of Indigenous people from the Convention’s history means that 
even scholarship emphasizing the broader contextual history of Native 
Nations is nevertheless relegated to a focus on white political figures.8 
This Article shifts traditional analysis.  First, I believe that in the summer 
of 1787, the “Constitution” remained a concept referring to a system of 
government.  The instrument drafted that summer reconfigured the 
constitution but the instrument was not yet the Constitution itself.  The 
Constitution as an instrument should therefore be interpreted within the 
larger concept of the Constitution as a system of government.  Second, with 
respect to this Constitution as a system of government, the drafters were 
hardly the only relevant actors.  A larger framing generation drafted the 
Constitution as a system of government.9  To refer to this context, the 
delegates used the phrase “without doors”10 and I employ that phrase here.  
 
Development in the Nineteenth Century 75–87 (2012) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Oklahoma) (ProQuest). 
 4. See, e.g., FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES:  THE HISTORY OF A 
POLITICAL ANOMALY 68–70 (1994); Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 
124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1021 (2015) [hereinafter Ablavsky, The Indian Commerce Clause]; 
Robert N. Clinton, The Dormant Indian Commerce Clause, 27 CONN. L. REV. 1055, 1147–58 
(1995); Timothy J. Preso, A Return to Uncertainty in Indian Affairs:  The Framers, the 
Supreme Court, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 19 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 443, 452–54 (1994).  
See generally Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999 (2014) 
[hereinafter Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution]. 
 5. PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 68. 
 6. Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1002. 
 7. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.02[3], at 22–23 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2012). 
 8. See generally Robert J. Miller, American Indian Constitutions and Their Influence on 
the United States Constitution, 159 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 32 (2015). 
 9. See Mary Sarah Bilder, The Emerging Genre of The Constitution:  Kent Newmyer and 
the Heroic Age, 52 CONN. L. REV. 1263, 1265–69 (2021). 
 10. For usage of the phrase, see, for example, Letter from James Madison to William Short 
(June 6, 1787), in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 31, 31 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 
1977) (“But the labor is great indeed; whether we consider the real or imaginary difficulties 
within doors or without doors.”); 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1787–1870, at 330 (1900) [hereinafter DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE CONSTITUTION] (“Butler.  The security the South[ern] States want is that their negroes 
may not be taken from [them] which some gentlemen within or without doors, have a very 
good mind to do.” (second alteration in original)). 
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The framing generation without doors was as responsible for the creation of 
the Constitution as the white men inside the Convention hall.11 
Analyzing the framing generation of the Constitution is a particularly 
useful approach in relationship to people whose paths became inextricably 
entwined with the development of the United States as a political and 
territorial state but who were not formally represented by the white deputies 
in the room.  Robert Clinton points out that “for Indian Nations, forging a 
treaty initially did not constitute, as in Europe, a process of forming a 
temporary alliance memorialized in a written document; it involved instead 
the formation of metaphoric, organic kinship ties.”12  Treaty making did not 
create a “static document” but “an organic and dynamic kinship between the 
treaty partners.”13  For Native Nations, the 1787 instrument did not abolish 
prior relationships with Congress and these relationships continued, albeit 
significantly reformulated.  Likewise, the new instrument did not repudiate 
but in fact reconfirmed prior treaty relationships.  A focus on the framing 
generation incorporates the influence of Native Nations on the Constitution 
without denying their sovereignty.14  Attention to the 1787 visits is a 
corrective measure to the classic use of the text of the 1787 Constitution as a 
starting point for constitutional analysis of federal Indian law.15 
 
 11. See generally MARY SARAH BILDER, FEMALE GENIUS:  THE LADY, GEORGE 
WASHINGTON, AND THE AGE OF THE CONSTITUTION (forthcoming 2022) (recounting the 
influence of Eliza Harriot Barons O’Connor, a female lecturer, on the Convention). 
 12. Robert Clinton, Treaties with Native Nations:  Iconic Historical Relics or Modern 
Necessity?, in NATION TO NATION:  TREATIES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND AMERICAN 
INDIAN NATIONS 15, 17 (Suzan Shown Harjo ed., 2014). 
 13. Id. 
 14. For a similar approach with respect to the influence on the revolutionary period, see 
generally KATHLEEN DUVAL, INDEPENDENCE LOST:  LIVES ON THE EDGE OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION (2015); WOODY HOLTON, FORCED FOUNDERS:  INDIANS, DEBTORS, SLAVES, AND 
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN VIRGINIA (1999); ALAN TAYLOR, AMERICAN 
REVOLUTIONS:  A CONTINENTAL HISTORY, 1750–1804 (2016); RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE 
GROUND:  INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION, 1650–1815 (20th 
anniversary ed. 2011). 
 15. Several word choices are of particular importance.  In contrast with many scholars, I 
use the terms “general government” and “Congress” (without “Continental” or 
“Confederation”) to refer to the political institutions of the United States.  Whether the 
reconstituted government was to be national or federal was a key debate and the meaning of 
those terms was shifting.  “General government” simply describes a government broader than 
that of the states.  “Congress” underscores the institution’s continuity throughout this period, 
particularly as far as Native Nations were concerned.  I refer to the Native Nations 
representatives as “deputies.”  I like this word because most of the delegates sent to 
Philadelphia from the states were described as deputies. 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 96, 199, 200, 203–04, 213, 222–23 (Merrill Jensen 
ed., 1976) [hereinafter DHRC] (describing the appointment of deputies in Virginia, 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Delaware, Georgia, South Carolina, Maryland, and New 
Hampshire).  And, I am aware of the ironic fact that decades later, Justice William Johnson 
insisted that the Hopewell Treaties’ authorization of a deputy did not mean that such a person 
“was to be recognized as a minister, or to sit in the congress as a delegate.” Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 25 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring).  Because contemporary 
correspondence repeatedly referred to “Nations,” I have followed that practice. See DOROTHY 
V. JONES, LICENSE FOR EMPIRE:  COLONIALISM BY TREATY IN EARLY AMERICA 20 (1982) 
(applying Emer de Vattel’s definition); Matthew L. M. Fletcher, Treaties as Recognition of a 
2021] NATIVE NATIONS AND THE CONVENTION 1711 
An explanation of the prior constitutional relationship between the Native 
Nations and the United States will help situate readers.16  During the decade 
between Congress’s Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the calling of 
the Convention in 1786, treaties formed the foundation of the constitutional 
relationships between the many Native Nations and Congress, as well as their 
relationships with the former colonies.17  Treaties underpinned the British 
government’s prior constitutional relationship to Native Nations.18  Of 
particular importance, the Proclamation of 1763 established the principle that 
Indian lands could only come into white possession through purchase or legal 
cession.19  When twenty-four Native Nations gathered with copies of the 
Proclamation to exchange gifts and the two-row wampum belt with the 
British, this treaty agreement, based on “peace, friendship, and respect,” 
reaffirmed “their preexisting rights to self-government.”20 
Before declaring independence a little over a decade later, Congress took 
the first steps to construct a similar constitution based on treaties with Native 
Nations.  In July 1775, the self-described “general congress at Philadelphia” 
reached out to the Six Nations, “our brothers,” and stated, “we wish you 
Indians may continue in peace with one another, and with us the white 
people.”21  The 1778 Treaty of Fort Pitt with the Delaware Nation guaranteed 
 
Nation-to-Nation Relationship, in NATION TO NATION, supra note 12, at 34, 34–35; O’Brien, 
supra note 3, at 42–43 (discussing the complexity of “nation” or “confederacy” with respect 
to the Choctaw Nation); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
1069, 1082–86 (2004).  The claim that “Nation” in this context was not meant to assert 
sovereignty does not appear to me to align with contemporary evidence. See Robert G. 
Natelson, The Original Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 
201, 259 (2007) (citing both Latin and English dictionary definitions).  Similarly, 
correspondence from Native Nations uses the terms “American” or “white” in contrast with 
“Indians,” in reference to control of territory and encroachment. See CALLOWAY, supra note 
3, at xv; see also LINDA TUHIWAI SMITH, DECOLONIZING METHODOLOGIES:  RESEARCH AND 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 6–7 (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the consequences of terms).  I have 
followed suit. 
 16. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, § 1.02[1]–[3], at 16–
23 (summarizing this history); see also PRUCHA, supra note 4, at 23–66. 
 17. See DAVID J. CARLSON, SOVEREIGN SELVES:  AMERICAN INDIAN AUTOBIOGRAPHY AND 
THE LAW 35–37 (2006) (noting that “Indian treaties construct (and, over time, reproduce) the 
parties and sovereign communities that they bind together”); JONES, supra note 15, at 148; 
Richard W. Hill, Linking Arms and Brightening the Chain:  Building Relations Through 
Treaties, in NATION TO NATION, supra note 12, at 37–42; Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power 
over Indians:  Its Sources, Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 200–01 (1984) 
(describing the treaty era).  See generally Reginald Horsman, The Indian Policy of an ‘Empire 
for Liberty,’ in NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE EARLY REPUBLIC 37 (Frederick E. Hoxie et al. 
eds., 1999). 
 18. See JONES, supra note 15, at 93–119; DANIEL K. RICHTER, FACING EAST FROM INDIAN 
COUNTRY:  A NATIVE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICA 134–50 (2001). 
 19. See COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE SCRATCH OF A PEN:  1763 AND THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF NORTH AMERICA 92–100 (2007). 
 20. Id. at 96–97; see John Borrows, Wampum at Niagara:  The Royal Proclamation, 
Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government, in ABORIGINAL AND TREATY RIGHTS IN 
CANADA:  ESSAYS ON LAW, EQUALITY, AND RESPECT FOR DIFFERENCE 155 (Michael Asch ed., 
1997). 
 21. “Speech” to the Six Nations (July 13, 1775), reprinted in 1 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN 
INDIAN DIPLOMACY:  TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775–1979, at 25, 26, 28 
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“aforesaid nation of Delawares, and their heirs, all their territorial rights in 
the fullest and most ample manner.”22  They could “form a state whereof the 
Delaware nation shall be the head, and have a representation in Congress.”23  
But the official end of the war with the British in 1783 redrew the map.  As 
Colin Calloway notes, “There were no Indians at the Peace of Paris in 1783 
when Britain handed over their lands to the United States and the new 
republic acquired an empire.”24  Despite the general impotence of Congress, 
agreements with Native Nations were prioritized.25  Between 1783 and 1786, 
Native Nations participated in twenty-one treaties; slightly more than half 
were with Americans—six with Congress and seven with the states.26  The 
initial treaties established by Congress after 1783 involved the territory north 
of the Ohio River and have been characterized by historians as involving 
arrogance and demands by congressional representatives with “partial at 
best” Native Nation representation.27 
 
(Vine Deloria Jr. & Raymond J. DeMallie eds., 1999).  See generally James H. Merrell, 
Declarations of Independence:  Indian-White Relations in the New Nation, in THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION:  ITS CHARACTER AND LIMITS 197 (Jack P. Greene ed., 1987). 
 22. Treaty with the Delawares, Del. Nation-U.S., Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13; COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, § 1.02[2], at 18. 
 23. Treaty with the Delawares, supra note 22. 
 24. CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 283.  For more discussion on the absence of deputies at 
the Treaty of Peace, see COLIN G. CALLOWAY, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN INDIAN 
COUNTRY:  CRISIS AND DIVERSITY IN NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES 273 (1995). 
 25. See WALTER MOHR, FEDERAL INDIAN RELATIONS, 1774–1788, at 93–172 (1933) 
(discussing federal policy in the 1780s).  See generally REGINALD HORSMAN, EXPANSION AND 
AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY, 1783–1812 (1967) (discussing federal policy); Reginald Horsman, 
American Indian Policy in the Old Northwest, 1783–1812, 18 WM. & MARY Q. 35 (1961).  
 26. CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 284–85; see JONES, supra note 15, at 188–95. 
 27. CALLOWAY, supra note 24, at 283; 18 EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS 278–81 
(Alden T. Vaughan & Colin G. Calloway eds., 1994); DAVID ANDREW NICHOLS, RED 
GENTLEMEN & WHITE SAVAGES:  INDIANS, FEDERALISTS, AND THE SEARCH FOR ORDER ON THE 
AMERICAN FRONTIER 24–36 (2008). 
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Figure 2:  A New Map of North America, with the West India Islands28 
 
 
But 1785–1786 seemed to signal a different approach, at least with respect 
to the significant Native Nations in the south.  Congress sought to neutralize 
Spanish influence with the Cherokee, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek 
Nations.  Between late 1786 and early 1787, treaty commissioners, Benjamin 
Hawkins, Joseph Martin, and Andrew Pickens formed almost identical 
treaties with the Cherokee Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and the Chickasaw 
Nation.  These treaties became known as the “Hopewell Treaties” because 
they were negotiated at Pickens’s home, Hopewell, on the Keowee River.29 
Boundaries were at the center.  In November 1785, Old Tassel (who was 
the First Beloved Man), thirty-six chiefs, and almost a thousand Cherokee 
citizens attended the treaty meeting at which Old Tassel drew the Cherokee 
boundaries on a map for the commissioners.30  The Treaty described the 
boundary “between the said Indians and the citizens of the United States” 
and exiled from United States protection any citizen or “person not being an 
Indian” who remained within the boundaries after six months.31  Congress 
was to possess the “sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with the 
Indians, and managing all their affairs.”32  The Treaty also provided a formal 
 
 28.  Thomas Pownall, A New Map of North America, with the West India Islands 
(illustration) (1786), in THOMAS KITCHIN, A GENERAL ATLAS DESCRIBING THE WHOLE 
UNIVERSE 30–31 (London, Robert Sayer 1790) (portraying a continent dominated by Native 
Nations). 
 29. See CALLOWAY, supra note 24, at 209, 235, 284; NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 44–54. 
 30. See CALLOWAY, supra note 24, at 209; CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 304. 
 31. Treaty with the Cherokee, Cherokee Nation-U.S., Nov. 28, 1785, 7 Stat. 18. 
 32. Id. 
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mechanism to ensure the “justice of the United States.”33  A provision 
authorized a deputy to be sent to Congress stating “[t]hat the Indians may 
have full confidence in the justice of the United States, respecting their 
interests, they shall have the right to send a deputy of their choice, whenever 
they think fit, to Congress.”34 
Immediately following this provision was the Treaty’s language stating 
that the peace and “friendship re-established” was to be maintained through 
the “utmost endeavors” of both sides.35  Sending a deputy to Congress was 
to promote furtherance of the treaty relationship.  The explicit provision 
relating to a deputy did not appear in the January 1786 Treaties with the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, but these treaties were otherwise 
prominently similar.36  The three Hopewell Treaties were published together 
in newspapers as if they represented one larger constitutional treaty 
establishing an understanding with all three nations.37 
In the wake of the Treaties, Congress began to take steps to consolidate its 
authority with respect to the states.  Under the Articles of Confederation, 
Congress had the “sole and exclusive right and power” of “entering into 
treaties and alliances.”38  The Articles explicitly barred the states, without 
consent of Congress, from entering into “any conference, agreement, 
alliance, or treaty, with any King, prince or state.”39  In addition, Congress’s 
powers included that of “regulating the trade and managing all affairs with 
the Indians, not members of any of the states, provided that the legislative 
right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated.”40  The 
drafting history of this provision was complicated; particularly contested was 
the carveout:  “not members of any of the states.”41  Subsequently, in August 
1786, Congress divided the United States into two geographic departments 
with respect to Indian affairs and created a superintendent position for the 
 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id.; see ANNIE H. ABEL, PROPOSALS FOR AN INDIAN STATE, 1778–1878, at 89 (1970) 
(discussing this provision and concluding that “we are obliged to infer that no great departure 
from existing practices was in contemplation”); see also Ezra Rosser, The Nature of 
Representation:  The Cherokee Right to a Congressional Delegate, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 91, 
120–29 (2005) (discussing the right to a deputy under the 1835 Treaty of New Echota); Ezra 
Rosser, Promises of Nonstate Representatives, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 118, 119 (2007). 
 35. Treaty with the Cherokee, supra note 31, at 10. 
 36. See Treaty with the Chickasaw, Chickasaw Nation-U.S., Jan. 10, 1786, 7 Stat. 24; 
Treaty with the Choctaw, Choctaw-U.S Nation, Jan. 3, 1786, 7 Stat. 21. 
 37. See, e.g., Articles of a Treaty Concluded at Hopewell, FED. GAZETTE & PHILA. DAILY 
ADVERTISER, Sept. 15, 1790. 
 38. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX; 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 86, 89–90; 
see COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 7, § 1.02[2], at 18–19; 
Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1012–13; Clinton, supra note 4, at 1098–
106. 
 39. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI; see also 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 88. 
 40. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IX; see also 1 DHRC, supra note 15, at 91. 
 41. See William David Cummings, “The Indians May Be Led, but Will Not Be Drove”:  
The Creek Indians Struggle for Control of Its Own Destiny, 1783–1794, at 137–38 (Mar. 
2016) (Ph.D. dissertation, North Dakota State University) (ProQuest) (discussing Georgia’s 
alleged interpretation of the Creek as “members” under earlier treaties). 
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southern section below the Ohio River.42  In October, James White was 
appointed.43  Virginia governor Edmund Randolph interpreted the 
appointment as an exercise of congressional authority bringing to an end the 
authority of Virginia’s own agent, Joseph Martin.44  For the three Native 
Nations, Congress, and Virginia, the Hopewell Treaties confirmed 
Congress’s dominance over the states. 
But, for North Carolina and Georgia—states that had not yet ceded their 
claimed western boundaries—the Treaties raised the possibility that the 
general government would stop unauthorized white encroachment.45  A 
patchwork of cessions, many contested and based on various purchases and 
state treaties, created theoretical areas open to white settlement.  Areas ceded 
by one group remained disputed by another.46  At Hopewell, North 
Carolina’s agent, William Blount, protested the Treaty and stated that it 
infringed on the state’s “legislative rights.”47  The North Carolina governor 
and the legislature passed a law declaring that anything done by the treaty 
commissioners was “null and void.”48  Along with Georgia, North Carolina 
developed semantic interpretations of the Articles under which the two states 
refuted congressional authority.  Treaty commissioner Benjamin Hawkins—
himself a North Carolina congressional delegate—explained the arguments 
in a letter to Thomas Jefferson about the fate of the “aborigines.”49  Although 
the Treaties had been attentive to “the rights of these people,” the two states 
launched protests.50  Georgia “will not allow that the Indians can be viewed 
in any other light than as members thereof” of the state, thereby claiming 
authority under the carveout within the Articles.51  North Carolina “allows a 
right of regulating Trade only without the fixing any boundary between the 
Indians and citizens, as they claim all the Land westward according to their 
bill of rights and that the Indians are only tenants at will.”52  In addition, the 
self-proclaimed State of Franklin under Governor John Sevier occupied 
 
 42. Ordinance for the Regulation of Indian Affairs, in 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, at 490, 491 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1912). 
 43. 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 747 (Oct. 6, 1786). 
 44. See Stephen B. Weeks, General Joseph Martin and the War of the Revolution in the 
West, in AM. HIST. ASS’N, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR 
THE YEAR 1893, at 401, 459 (1894). 
 45. See generally Kathleen DuVal, Independence for Whom?:  Expansion and Conflict in 
the South and Southwest, in THE WORLD OF THE REVOLUTIONARY AMERICAN REPUBLIC:  LAND, 
LABOR, AND THE CONFLICT FOR A CONTINENT 97 (Andrew Shankman ed., 2014). 
 46. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 
22–23 (1986) (discussing the Chickamauga Cherokee). 
 47. Letter from William Blount to Benjamin Hawkins, Andrew Pickens, Joseph Martin & 
Lachlan McIntosh (Nov. 28, 1785) (available at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library, University of Georgia); see Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, supra note 4, at 1029. 
 48. Extract from the Minutes of the Georgia General Assembly (Feb. 11, 1786), in 18 
EARLY AMERICAN INDIAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 27, at 427–28; see also CALLOWAY, supra 
note 3, at 304–05. 
 49. Letter from Benjamin Hawkins to Thomas Jefferson (June 14, 1786), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 640, 641(Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954). 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
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western territory that the Articles presumed would be ceded to the United 
States but over which North Carolina had rescinded any cession.53  The 
Franklinites used an “unscrupulous 1785 Treaty of Dumplin Creek” to claim 
land reserved to the Cherokee Nation at Hopewell.54  Georgia maintained its 
claims—referred to as Yazoo lands—until 1802.55  Indeed, in early August 
1787, Georgia acquired a small strip of western land ceded from South 
Carolina.56 
From the perspective of the southern Native Nations, these disputed 
western claims lay within their boundaries and the continued white 
encroachment raised questions about the reliability of the United States.57  
Indian communities disagreed over whether the United States or the Spanish 
was more dependable.  The Hopewell Treaty with the Chickasaw Nation did 
not have the support of the pro-Spanish contingent.58  The Creek Nation 
found itself divided.  Alexander McGillivray led the largest contingent to 
sign the Treaty of Pensacola with the Spanish in 1784, and the U.S. 
commissioners were unsuccessful in achieving a treaty.59  The Spanish 
remained committed to control of the Mississippi River—and the instability 
of the United States worked to the advantage of the Spanish governor-general 
in New Orleans.  Throughout this period, the southern Native Nations 
entertained repeated invitations and overtures from Spanish diplomatic 
officials.60  Further complicating matters, various political leaders associated 
with the white western settlements began to consider aligning themselves 
with Spain—referred to by nineteenth-century historians as the “Spanish 
Conspiracy.”61  In 1786, James White—the soon appointed superintendent 
of Indian affairs for the southern district—began inquiries with the Spanish 
minister Don Diego de Gardoqui, suggesting that the southern states might 
leave the United States if the Mississippi were transferred to Spain.62 
Thus 1786 marked a particularly fraught moment in the balance of power 
and territory.  As historian Colin Calloway has emphasized, “there was a time 
when the outcome of the struggle seemed in doubt” and “Indian power . . . 
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remained strong, despite the inroads of disease, dispossession, and escalating 
warfare.”63  Indeed, 1786 brought increased opposition by Native Nations.  
In January, a treaty at Fort Finney with the Shawnee Nation was 
“disavowed.”64  In the northwest, Joseph Brant began to gather an Indian 
confederacy.65  A northern confederacy threatened congressional and land 
company plans for the area north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi.  
Since 1784, congressional declarations and plans had imagined conversion 
of northwestern territory into white-occupied and survey-defined new 
states.66  But even after northern states ceded their paper colonial claims to 
the general government in 1784 and 1786, the requisite purchases “of the 
Indian inhabitants” remained largely in the future.67  In late 1786, the 
northwest United Indian Nations declared that any “cession of our lands 
should be made” only “by the united voice of the confederacy” and they 
declared all “partial treaties” void.68  The United Indian Nations suggested 
meeting in the spring of 1787 to pursue a general treaty.69  Requiring 
Congress to deal with a united group of Native Nations and to pursue land 
cessions only through such a group would have radically rebalanced the 
power dynamic.  With a barren treasury and a largely nonexistent military 
force—and with Spain and Great Britain controlling surrounding 
territories—the general U.S. government plausibly faced defeat in any war 
with Native Nations.70 
In this moment, four representatives of Native Nations set forth for 
Congress.  This Article recovers the story of their visits, including George 
Washington’s public handshake with Sconetoyah, the Cherokee chief.  It then 
examines the consequences of the visits, focusing on Congress’s passage of 
the Northwest Ordinance, Secretary at War Henry Knox’s report on Indian 
Affairs, and the Convention’s drafting of clauses relating to Native Nations.  
The conclusion traces the aftermath of the visits for the major actors.  This 
analysis largely supports Robert Clinton’s 1995 interpretation that the 
Convention presumed the general government’s authority in dealing with 
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Native Nations, accepted the autonomous legal status of the tribes, and 
incorporated its broad “Commerce . . . .  with the Indian Tribes”—including 
affairs and trade—as a fail-safe to end illegitimate and dangerous claims of 
state authority at long last.71 
I believe that continually unfolding history is relevant to modern 
constitutionalism and therefore am not an originalist.  Indeed, significant 
structural transformations in the relationship of Native Nations and the 
United States since 1787 make selective use of this history particularly 
tenuous as the sole basis for contemporary constitutional interpretation.72  
Over more than two centuries, U.S. constitutional jurisprudence channeled 
and legitimized the dispossession of Native Nations’ land, sovereignty, and 
identities through a series of doctrines that shifted repeatedly.73  The most 
important aspect of the history recounted in this Article is drawn from a 
moment when Native Nations constituted a significant threat and controlled 
most of the territory now considered part of the United States.  The system 
of government framed in the Constitution presumed the sovereignty of 
Native Nations.  Deputies to Congress reflected one aspect of this 
recognition.  Eventually, however, the provisions for a deputy to Congress in 
the Fort Pitt and Hopewell Treaties were forsaken.  It would be fitting and 
just if the United States would now ensure representation of Native Nations 
in Congress.74 
II.  A DEPUTATION TO CONGRESS 
At the end of May 1787, newspapers began to report the progress of three 
chiefs of Native Nations as they traveled to Congress; they were members of 
the Cherokee Nation, the Choctaw Nation, and the Chickasaw Nation.75  
Several months earlier, Governor Randolph of Virginia had learned of a 
“deputation” to Congress from Native Nations.76  Newspaper reports of the 
visits by the deputies circulated throughout the summer, intermingled with 
reports on the Creek Nation, the murder of Cherokee hunters by Kentuckians, 
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rising tensions over Franklin’s land office, and alleged Spanish intervention 
in the west.  Secretary at War Henry Knox left New York for Philadelphia in 
June to meet specifically with the deputies.  Outside of the Convention, 
George Washington also met them, as did the governors of Virginia, North 
Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  Although Congress reconvened in early July to 
adopt the Northwest Ordinance, the deputies would not appear, having been 
persuaded to return home.  But their visit had repercussions that changed the 
Constitution and relationship of the United States to Native Nations. 
A.  The Choctaw Nation 
Within months of the Hopewell Treaties, the Choctaw Nation decided to 
hold the United States to the treaty commitments.  The southwestern Native 
Nations faced an increasingly volatile situation.  Matters between Georgia 
and the Creek Nation, led by Alexander McGillivray, reached a point of 
collision.  By 1786, “Creek Country [was] torn but also on the verge of all-
out war.”77  The Spanish supported McGillivray as part of their strategy to 
ensure control of the Mississippi.  The Oconee War broke out by November, 
with the Spanish providing ammunition to Creek raiding parties.78  The other 
Native Nations found themselves under pressure to choose a side.  Indian 
agent William Davenport wrote to Georgia’s governor that the Choctaw 
Nation was being courted by the Spanish.79  The Spanish governor of 
Louisiana and West Florida, Esteban Miró, sought the allegiance of 
Franchimastabé, the head of the Choctaw Nation.80 
At the end of November 1786, therefore, Franchimastabé sought 
reassurance as to the friendship of the United States.81  In a talk for Congress, 
he questioned whether the United States was disposed to preserve treaties, 
focusing in particular on boundaries.82  In addition, the economic 
impoverishment of the United States raised concerns about whether the 
general government could carry through on promised trade.83  Congress 
needed to demonstrate its enforcement of treaties made with Native Nations.  
Underlying the talk was the implication that the Choctaw Nation could turn 
to Spain if the United States failed to honor its treaties.  Indeed, four months 
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later, in March 1787, after hearing nothing from Congress, Taski Etoka (the 
Chickasaw “king”) and Franchimastabée sent a talk to Miró.84 
In focusing on Congress and the Treaty, the Choctaw Nation explicitly 
rejected state authority and that of Georgia in particular.  In the fall of 1786, 
Georgia sent an agent, John Woods, to the Choctaw Nation with instructions 
that ran counter to the Articles and the Treaties.  The appointment of Woods 
from Georgia was recent.85  Previously, he had traveled with Choctaw 
delegations:  in 1784, to Savannah, Georgia,86 and in January 1786 as an 
escort and witness at the Hopewell Treaties.87  In March 1786, shortly after 
the treaty meeting, the Georgia legislature gave Woods instructions asserting 
the state’s sovereignty over the Choctaw Nation.88  In an effort to claim 
authority under the Articles’ carveout, Georgia asserted control over the 
Choctaw Nation as members of the state.  Wood’s instructions declared:  
“You are to consider the different Nations, Tribes or Towns of Indians within 
the Jurisdiction aforesaid as Members of this State.”89  Georgia’s legal stance 
put the state in direct conflict with Congress. 
Not surprisingly, the Choctaw Nation rejected Georgia’s claim.  As Woods 
explained to the Georgia governor, the Choctaw Nation did not consider 
Woods “Vested, with proper Authority, to transact the business of their 
Nation, by virtue of [a] Commission, from the State of Georgia.”90  The 
Hopewell Treaty represented a decision to treat with the “Continental 
Commissioners.”91  The Choctaw Nation was “determined, to hold fast the 
Treaty” and “they Would pay No regard to Any Authority, which did not 
Originate, And derive, from Congress.”92  The Hopewell Treaty represented 
the reciprocal commitment of the Choctaw Nation and Congress.93  Indeed, 
Woods’s letter subtly emphasized the Choctaw Nation’s territorial 
sovereignty:  he had returned “into their land” and met at the “seat of 
government” with “the King, and Great leading Chief, of that Nation.”94  
Moreover, in referring to the “treaty . . . at Seneca”—the river, rather than 
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Hopewell—the white settlement was erased, at least semantically.95  As the 
Choctaw Nation “[n]either Would hear, Or send, any More talks to the State 
of Georgia,” Woods returned the state’s commission, nonetheless requesting 
payment for four lost horses and other expenses.96 
In accordance with the recognition of Congress and the Treaty, one of the 
“great leading chiefs” of the Choctaw Nation, Tobocah, set off for 
Congress.97  American newspapers repeatedly identified him as a Choctaw 
king.98  Tobocah had been a signer at Hopewell but had spoken last, allegedly 
“disgraced” for having taken a Spanish medal.99  Commissioner Joseph 
Martin described Tobocah as having “always been sent by the Nation as their 
representative in all their important Negotiations.”100  At Hopewell, Tobocah 
described himself as “a headman in my Nation to receive and to give out 
talks” and expressed the desire “to see Congress some days.”101  Freed from 
Georgia’s authority, Woods accompanied him to Philadelphia.102 
Also accompanying Tobocah was a woman described by white observers 
as the “Queen” or “his Lady.”103  Her presence underscored the importance 
of the diplomatic mission.104  Although women did not hold formal 
leadership roles in the Choctaw Nation, their presence legitimized diplomatic 
negotiations.  On the two-month journey to Hopewell, ten women had 
accompanied Tobocah and other chiefs and warriors.105  The Queen may 
have been one of the women at Hopewell and, in any event, her presence 
strengthened the official nature of the visit. 
Tobocah and the Queen left the Choctaw Nation, likely by horseback, in 
late November 1786.106  A king and queen traveling to Congress from the 
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Choctaw Nation reinforced the exclusive authority of Congress over treaties 
with “any King, Prince or state.”107  By January, when Woods wrote the 
Georgia governor, the group had traveled through “the Chickasaws, thence 
through the Creeks, thence into the Cherokees.”108  Two of those Nations 
also had entered into Hopewell Treaty relationships.  Tobocah sought other 
deputies who likewise wanted reassurance of Congress’s commitment. 
B.  The Chickasaw Nation 
The Chickasaw Nation chose a war captain named Muckleshamingo to 
journey to Congress with Tobocah.109  Variously described as a “Chickasaw 
captain” or “Chickasaw chief,” Muckleshamingo’s presence was approved 
by the two prominent heads of the Nation:  Chinnubee and Piomingo.110  
Muckleshamingo carried a talk for Congress whose contents likely mirrored 
a similar talk sent by Piomingo.111  The Chickasaw Nation worried about 
white encroachment in violation of the Treaty.  They were “sorry to hear that 
the white People are settling all the lands Belonging to our Brothers, the 
Cherokees.”112  The contrast between “white people” and “Brothers” 
underscored the universal problem of white expansion.  Piomongo added, “I 
speak now for the Choctaws as well as my own People; we are all very uneasy 
about it, as we are told the Americans Intend[] to take all our Country Before 
they [are] Done.”113  Piomongo consistently contrasted “we” with “the 
Americans.”  Piomingo made clear that they hoped that “something will be 
Done to prevent it,” otherwise “when all their lands Is settled our Lands will 
go the same way.”114  And the possessive emphasis of “lands Belonging to” 
and “our lands” insisted on territorial sovereignty.  In addition, the 
Chickasaw Nation was worried about the failure to increase trade as promised 
under the Treaty.115  Piomingo wondered if “[y]ou only ment to Jockey us 
out of our Lands.”116  The Nation wished “to hold you Fast”—that is, commit 
to an exclusive relationship—but if Congress did not act, “necessity will 
 
 107. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Letter from Henry Knox to Chamby, Chickasaw Chief (June 27, 1787) (available 
at the William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor) (naming 
Muckleshamingo). 
 110. See 15 COLONIAL RECORDS OF PENNSYLVANIA, supra note 103, at 228–29 (reporting 
a bill of expenses referring to “a Chickasaw Captain”); Letter from Tobocah, Choctaw Chief 
& a Chickasaw Captain to Benjamin Franklin (June 19, 1787) (available at the American 
Philosophical Society Library).  For previous speculations as to identity, see ARRELL M. 
GIBSON, THE CHICKASAWS 85–86 (1971) (Piomingo); Flaherty, supra note 3, at 77 
(Chinubbee, brother to Taskitetoka). 
 111. A Talk for Colo. Joseph Martin—from Piomingo, One of the Chiefs of That Tribe 
(Feb. 15, 1787), in 4 CALENDAR OF VIRGINIA STATE PAPERS, supra note 76, at 241.  I have not 
been able to locate the talk given to Knox. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
2021] NATIVE NATIONS AND THE CONVENTION 1723 
oblige us to Look for new friends.”117  Congress had a choice:  stop white 
encroachment or the Nations would align with Spain. 
After leaving the Chickasaw Nation, Tobocah, the Queen, 
Muckleshamingo, and Woods may have traveled to the Creek Nation.118  But 
no deputy from the Creek Nation appears to have joined the group.  Instead, 
information about the Creek Nation’s plan to move against Georgia traveled 
with the delegation.  By early 1787, the deputation was staying with 
Governor Sevier at his home, Mount Pleasant (now in northeastern 
Tennessee).119  They hoped to meet with James White, the new 
superintendent of the southern department.120  But White seems not to have 
appeared; indeed, he likely had begun to privately encourage the Spanish 
minister Don Diego de Gardoqui to consider the possibility that the southern 
states might break from the United States over the loss of the Mississippi.121  
Sevier was quick to send on news of the visitors.  To the Georgia governor, 
Sevier described the group as having “set out for Congress in Order to 
negociate national business.”122  Likewise, Arthur Campbell wrote the 
Virginia governor that the group was “going to Congress to lay before them 
the true state of affairs of the Southern Indians.”123  By late March, southern 
governors knew the deputation planned to negotiate with Congress on behalf 
of the “Southern Indians”—an apparently nearly united group, intriguingly 
parallel to the northern United Indian Nations. 
C.  The Cherokee Nation 
In early April when the deputation left for Philadelphia en route to New 
York, no Cherokee Nation representative accompanied them.124  Woods had 
urged Old Tassel to join but he declined.125  Old Tassel hoped to hear from 
Congress through official channels.  In March, Martin had arrived at the 
Cherokee town of Chota and was told to write to the “Beloved men of 
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Congress.”126  Similarly, Old Tassel had urged Hawkins to “do 
Something.”127  Thus, Old Tassel decided to “sett still till I hear from 
Congress.”128 
Nonetheless, in the meantime, the Cherokee Nation faced a crisis.  Martin 
“[f]ound the Indians in Greater Confusion Than I Ever saw them.”129  The 
“pretended State of Franklin” was holding an assembly and opening a land 
office to distribute Cherokee Nation land, including the “Beloved Town, 
Chota.”130  Old Tassel’s talk confirmed the problem:  the “Franklin people 
are Settling all our Lands.”131  Martin concluded that the Franklinists were 
taking “every step that appears most productive to a war” and that “nothing 
will Remove” the white settlers “but an armed Force.”132  He was not alone 
in worrying about an Indian war triggered by encroachment.133  The French 
at Muscle Shoals spread rumors that the three European powers were joined 
against the Americans with the Creeks and “Northward Indians” to “strike 
this spring.”134  Old Tassel similarly hinted at an impending military 
engagement with the Americans, on one side, and the Northward Indians, the 
Creek, the Spanish, and the French, on the other.135 
In addition to the issue of Franklin, Kentucky colonel John Logan, the 
titular county sheriff, and a large militia group recently had killed at least 
seven Cherokee.  Details gradually emerged from letters sent to the Virginia 
governor.  The Kentucky people had killed some of the “friends” of “some 
of the Chickamogga people.”136  In a letter filled with implicit scorn at the 
inability to distinguish among Indians, Martin recounted how Logan had set 
off against a “Crow Town” but “missing his way,” had killed seven 
hunters.137  Another correspondent explained that Logan and around one 
hundred men had set out to “attack and destroy a Small Town of the 
Cherokees” whom they blamed for “depredations on the Kentucky-Path.”138  
The seven people killed included a chief from “the friendly Towns.”139  
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Martin was told by the Cherokee Nation that “if the White People” let them 
live in peace, “nothing will Induce them To Take up the Hatchett or Join the 
Spaniards.”140  However, “if they are to be killed whenever they Go to Hunt, 
they must have Satisfaction.”141 
There were two talks to Congress sent with Martin, both emphasizing the 
problem of white encroachment.  The Cherokee Nation wanted Congress to 
have “their people moved off our Lands.”142  Chief Hanging Maw explained, 
“[w]e have held several treaties with the Americans” in which “[b]ounds was 
always fixt and fair promises always made that the white people should not 
come over.”143  In the past, he pointed out, “we always find that after a treaty 
they Settle much faster than before.”144  But this time—at Hopewell—they 
had “treated with Congress.”145  Congress was different from an individual 
state and Hanging Maw believed that “we made no doubt but we should have 
Justice.”146  Yet, the Cherokee Nation was being told that the Americans 
meant to “deceive us” and they were beginning to “think it is true.”147 
Although Martin left Chota to head in theory towards Congress, Old Tassel 
and Hanging Maw decided to send their own deputy by another route.  They 
needed someone important enough to be treated as a representative, yet who 
would not undermine the official channel hopefully represented by Martin 
and Hawkins.  They chose a young man, Sconetoyah, described by 
newspapers as the “brave young Warrior Sconetoyah, an Indian Chief of the 
Cherokee Nation.”148  He was “a War Captain and son to one of the principal 
Chiefs of that nation.”149  In fact, Sconetoyah was the son of Katteuha, the 
Beloved Woman of Chota, the most important female political leader, and he 
carried a talk to Congress from her.150  Later that summer, Benjamin Franklin 
complimented Katteuha on “having so good a Son.”151  Striking a personal 
tone, Franklin hoped that she would have the “Benefit of his Support when 
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you grow old.”152  Accompanying Sconetoyah was Alexander Dromgoole, a 
trader-interpreter, possibly a relative of Old Tassel by marriage.153 
In April, as the two groups moved toward Philadelphia, news of the 
impending Convention mingled with the volatile western situation.  
Governor Edmund Randolph worried that he had overstepped the Articles of 
Confederation by sending a talk to the Cherokee leaders.154  He explained 
that the “Cherokees have begun to be troublesome in our country” so he had 
to “direct some soothing steps to be taken on the part of Virginia” by sending 
the talk.155  Indeed, Randolph tried but failed to get state attorney general 
Harry Innes to prosecute Logan for the murders.156 
In mid-April, Congress finally received the talks from Old Tassel and 
Hanging Maw that were sent in September 1786.157  The committee on 
Indian affairs, headed by James Madison, took up the stated concerns but 
they seemed not to be a priority.  In addition to preparing for the Convention, 
Madison spent the spring addressing British accusations of state violations of 
the Treaty of Peace and trying to prevent John Jay from relinquishing 
American navigation of the Mississippi in negotiations with the Spanish.158  
Madison probably left New York for Philadelphia before his committee gave 
a report on May 8 about the Cherokee Nation’s complaints (the report has 
never been located).159  The next day, May 9, an ordinance for “the 
government of the Western Territory” was read for a second time, then 
postponed before its final reading on May 10.160  As delegates left for 
Philadelphia, Congress lost its quorum on May 11 and was not expected to 
reconvene until after the Convention.161 
Throughout May, deep concern about white encroachment continued to 
spread, joined by news of meetings—conventions—of Native Nations.  The 
southern department superintendent, James White, warned Knox that 
increased encroachments would lead to violence.  As he put it, “the white 
people on the frontier” were “continuing their encroachments” and extending 
 
 152. Id.; see TRANSATLANTIC FEMINISMS IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 178–83 (Lisa L. 
Moore et al. eds., 2012); cf. M. Amanda Moulder, “By Women, You Were Brought Forth into 
This World”:  Cherokee Women’s Oratorical Education in the Late Eighteenth Century, in 
RHETORIC, HISTORY, AND WOMEN’S ORATORICAL EDUCATION:  AMERICAN WOMEN LEARN TO 
SPEAK 19 (David Gold & Catherine L. Hobbs eds., 2013). 
 153. HOIG, supra note 3, at 70 (stating Dromgoole may have “married a sister of Corn 
Tassel’s nephew, John Watts Kunoskekie”). 
 154. Letter from Edmund Randolph to Virginia Delegates (Apr. 4, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS 
OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 366, 366. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 366 n.1. 
 158. See GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’ UNION:  SLAVERY, POLITICS, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 159 (2010). 
 159. James Madison, Notes on Debates in Congress (Apr. 26, 1787), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON, supra note 10, at 407, 407; Letter from Edmund Randolph to Virginia 
Delegates, supra note 154. 
 160. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 42, at 274–75, 283. 
 161. Id. at 292. 
2021] NATIVE NATIONS AND THE CONVENTION 1727 
“their surveys into the Indian country.”162  White noted “[t]he natural 
reluctance of the Indians to part with any of their lands; for, to use their 
expression, they look on their lands as their blood and their life, which they 
must fight for rather than part with.”163  The Georgia governor was informed 
of a “Convention” of “Nations to the North and West.”164  Unless white 
encroachment halted, war appeared inevitable and understandable.165  
Although Congress had created a regulatory division based on the Ohio 
River, there appears to have been movement toward a unified western 
response by Native Nations against white encroachment.  The Chickasaw 
Nation gathered in a general meeting to discuss a convention of “all 
Nations.”166  A continental confederation of Native Nations would be a 
formidable opposition to the tenuous confederation of states. 
III.  PHILADELPHIA 
Throughout May, newspapers reported the progress of the two deputations.  
By mid-May, Sconetoyah was in Winchester.167  By the end of the month, 
the “Prince of the Cherokee Nation” passed through Fredericksburg168 and 
Tobocah, the Queen, and Muckleshamingo passed through 
Charlottesville.169  Word spread about their progress as they applied to 
Virginia and Maryland for funds to complete their journeys.170  Only on June 
12 did Sconetoyah reach Philadelphia, followed by the second deputation on 
June 18.  Although intending to travel on to New York and to Congress, both 
groups turned back toward their homes after staying in Philadelphia for 
several weeks. 
 
 162. Letter from James White to Henry Knox (May 24, 1787), in DOCUMENTS AND OTHER 
PAPERS RELATING TO THE BOUNDARY LINE BETWEEN THE STATES OF GEORGIA AND FLORIDA 
16 (Washington, Beverley Tucker 1855).  For more concerns on these hostilities, see Letter 
from Henry Knox to George Washington (July 6, 1789), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE 
WASHINGTON:  PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 123 (Dorothy Twohig ed., 1989). 
 163. Letter from James White to Henry Knox, supra note 162, at 18. 
 164. Letter from William Davenport to the Governor of Georgia (May 27, 1787) (available 
at the Hargrett Rare Book and Manuscript Library, University of Georgia). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Frederick-Town, May 30.  Extract of a Letter from Winchester, May 26, 1787, supra 
note 75. 
 168. Frederick-Town, June 6, MD. CHRON. OR UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER, June 6, 1787 
(noting a Cherokee prince passing through on “Wednesday last”). 
 169. See Frederick-Town, May 30.  Extract of a Letter from Winchester, May 26, 1787, 
supra note 75. 
 170. In Annapolis, they stopped because they were “without money.”  Woods applied for 
a supply “to pay for their Passages from Richmond to the Head of the Elk and to take them to 
as far as Philadelphia.” Letter from Thomas Harwood to Delegates in Congress (June 14, 
1787) (available at the Maryland State Archives). 
1728 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89 
A.  Treaty Supremacy 
When the Convention began in late May, Governor Randolph’s opening 
speech promoted expansive national power over the states.171  His earlier 
view that the general government had exclusive authority over relations with 
Native Nations seemingly was confirmed in the Virginia delegation’s draft 
plan to give the national legislature authority well beyond that of the current 
Congress and to legislate wherever the states were “incompetent” or when 
national legislation was needed to ensure the “harmony of the United 
States.”172  The national legislature seemed ready to rebuff Georgia’s 
repeated efforts to insist on its own authority over Native Nations.  There was 
to be a national legislative negative, or veto, on all state laws “contravening 
in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.”173  
Similarly, the states were “bound by oath to support the articles of Union.”174  
The national legislature was also to be authorized “to call forth the force of 
the Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the 
articles thereof.”175 
In justifying Virginia’s plan, Randolph blamed the misguided optimism of 
the Articles, which resulted in the current instability.  As he put it, at that 
earlier point, “treaties had not been violated.”176  Randolph’s repeated 
concern about the western boundary seemed an overt reference to the recent 
Hopewell Treaties.  These violations established that a different approach 
was required substantively and linguistically.  Indeed, for some delegates, the 
plan was not sufficiently explicit about state exclusion from treaties.  Almost 
immediately, Benjamin Franklin made sure that the national supremacy 
included treaties.  He proposed that states were bound to support “any 
Treaties subsisting under the authority of the union.”177  Apparently there 
was unanimous approval.178  National treaty supremacy was a foundational 
principle within the Convention’s early consensus. 
As the Convention delegates guaranteed national treaty supremacy, a 
widely reprinted newspaper account described the impending Native 
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Nation’s visits to be about compliance with the Hopewell Treaties and the 
prevention of white encroachment.  This account began with the Cherokee 
Nation chief and ended with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations.  The 
purpose was to discuss the Hopewell Treaties with Congress.  In between, 
the account summarized various examples of disputes arising from white 
encroachment in the western territories.  It is useful to reprint the article in 
full as it appeared in New York and Philadelphia newspapers: 
Last evening arrived here, Mr. Alexander Dromgoole, on his way to 
Congress, with an Indian Chief, one of the Cherokee nation, who will 
remain in town a few days.  We are told that this Chief’s business is 
principally concerning a treaty held at Hopewell, on the Keowee, between 
the Commissioners of the united states of America, and the head men and 
warriors of the Cherokee Nation.  By this gentleman we are informed, that 
the Creek nation are encouraged to war against the settlements of Georgia 
and Cumberland, and it is said that all their towns at this time, are supplied 
with large quantities of powder and lead, by the Spaniards, for that purpose.  
It is also said, that the northern Indians are all determined to take up the 
hatchet this summer, in retaliation for the depredations committed by the 
Kentucky people in burning their towns last fall.  That there have been some 
French traders at the Muscle Shoals, on the Tenessee river, last winter 
trading from Detroit, who have been encouraging the Cherokees to go to 
war, but they pay little attention to their council. 
By late accounts from Kentucky it appears, that five persons have lately 
been killed by the Indians on the north side, among whom were a son and 
overseer of Gen. Scott’s, who were out on a fowling party.  That three 
women were killed in a place called the Rich Valley, near the head of 
Holston, and many others killed on the waters of Clinch.  Several of the 
Indians have been seen near the great road that leads from Holston to 
Winchester, which has alarmed the people very much. 
By a gentleman from Charlottesville, we are told, that there is a Choctaw 
Chief, and a Chickesaw, on their way to Congress; they passed through that 
town about the 20th of May.179 
Reading between the lines, the actions of settlers in Georgia, Cumberland, 
North Carolina, and Kentucky, Virginia, were bringing the United States to 
the brink of great violence.  To uphold treaty relationships between the 
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United States and the Native Nations might prevent a European-backed 
Indian war. 
In contrast to this possible violent path was a path of political friendship 
between Native Nations and the United States.  As Sconetoyah neared 
Philadelphia, another reprinted article cast him as the “Friend of the United 
States.”180  In Baltimore, he had been welcomed and showed “an exquisite 
Sensibility of Mind”: 
During his Stay in this Town, tho’ an untutored Son of Nature, he behaved 
with the Propriety of a civilized Citizen, and deservedly gained the 
Attention of many respectable Americans and Foreigners, who entertained 
him with the greatest Hospitality.  His Gratitude was manifested, on these 
Occasions, in a Manner expressive of an exquisite Sensibility of Mind, and 
he appeared to obey the strong Impulse of lively Gratitude, at the Moment 
of his Departure, in requesting that “the hearty Thanks of SCONETOYAH, 
the Friend of the United States,” might be presented, thro’ the Channel of 
this Paper, “to the generous Inhabitants and great Warriors of 
Baltimore.”181 
The newspaper account sought to reassure white readers that coexistence was 
possible.  The Cherokee chief—romanticized as the “untutored Son of 
Nature”—had behaved “with the Propriety of a civilized Citizen.”  The 
hospitality provided by “many respectable Americans,” as well as the “lively 
Gratitude” of Sconetoyah, presented an acceptable option for white 
Americans.  The term “friend”—a word signaling both the chain of 
friendship of treaties and perhaps also alluding to the “firm league of 
friendship” of the states described in the Articles of Confederation—carried 
political symbolism.182 
Inside the Philadelphia Convention, the delegates continued to meet as a 
Committee of the Whole House and to accept general government authority 
relating to treaties.  In the discussion of the proposed legislative negative, 
state violations of treaties figured prominently.183  Georgia’s practice of 
linguistic caviling under the Articles seemed to motivate further decisions.  
Its attempt to claim that Native Nations were members of the state of Georgia 
was blocked by a substituted rule of representation.  That rule explicitly 
excluded “Indians not paying taxes.”184  Membership in the state thus would 
be determined by volitional tax paying, not geographical location.  Only if 
Indians chose to pay taxes could the state count them.  In brief, the rule barred 
the states from unilaterally incorporating the members of Native Nations 
through state legislation.  As the Convention approached the completion of 
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its committee draft, state authority to treat with Native Nations appeared 
decisively prohibited. 
B.  Washington’s Handshake 
On Tuesday, June 12, Sconetoyah arrived at the Indian King Tavern in 
Philadelphia, where he and Dromgoole stayed until July 1.185  The 
Philadelphia newspapers covered Sconetoyah’s movements over the next 
several days, repeatedly emphasizing his goal to ensure observance of the 
Treaty against white encroachment.186  As the Independent Gazetteer 
reported on June 14, Sconetoyah planned to present grievances to Congress 
and to demand observance of the Hopewell Treaty, “which they say has been 
violated and infringed by the lawless and unruly whites on the frontiers.”187  
The same report added, “We are informed that a Choctaw King, and a 
Chickasaw Chief, are also on their way to New-York, to have a Talk with 
Congress, and to brighten the chain of friendship.”188  This account was 
reprinted far beyond Philadelphia throughout the month.189 
The day after Sconetoyah arrived, the Convention heard the completed 
Report of the Committee of the Whole House.190  This June 13 report 
established extensive national powers in Congress and included a negative 
over state laws that contravened, in Congress’s opinion, “any treaties 
subsisting under the authority of the Union.”191  In addition, the states were 
barred from claiming Native Nations within their jurisdiction through the 
exclusion of “Indians not paying taxes in each State” from the ratio of 
representation.192  The Convention immediately postponed discussion and 
adjourned.193 
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Following adjournment, the delegates met publicly with Sconetoyah.  As 
the newspaper recounted:  “Sconetoyah, a warrior of the Cherokee nation, 
sent with a letter to Congress by the king of that nation, conducted by Mr. 
Dromgoole, was introduced to his Excel. Alex. Martin, late Governor of 
North-Carolina, and a number of the gentlemen members of the 
Convention.”194  This emphasis was intended to send a message.  The 
representative of the king of the Cherokee Nation, Sconetoyah, met the 
former governor of the state that refused to recognize the Cherokee 
boundaries.  In addition to this public meeting with Martin, Sconetoyah met 
a “number of the gentlemen Members of the Convention.”195  Here again, 
the Cherokee Nation’s treaty concerns intertwined with the Convention’s 
work on a new constitution. 
Of even greater significance, Sconetoyah met George Washington at the 
Pennsylvania State House.  Always referred to as “the General,” Washington 
signified the United States and the Convention of which he was president.  
The location of the meeting at the State House suggested an official 
diplomatic event.  The discussion took place within the norms of diplomatic 
courtesy.  Thus, Washington expressed concern regarding the health of “the 
King and all his people.”196  The newspapers described the meeting in detail 
and emphasized the handshake between Washington and Sconetoyah: 
[He] was from thence conducted to the State-House, where he had the 
honor of taking his Excellency General Washington by the hand.  The 
General said he was glad to see him, and hoped he left the King and all his 
people well when he came from home, which he answered and said he did.  
He also asked him his business to Congress, which he told the General, it 
was chiefly respecting the white people incroaching on their lands.  The 
general took him by the hand, and bid him farewell; wished him great 
success in his business, and a safe return to the nation, that he might find 
all his people well when he returned.197 
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Washington shook hands—a pledge of faith—once in greeting and once in 
parting.  The newspaper described Sconetoyah instigating the first handshake 
and Washington instigating the second.  The meeting thus appeared to be the 
diplomatic meeting of representatives of two sovereign nations.198 
The two men carried on a public conversation about the fundamental 
problem of white encroachment.  As the newspapers described, the primary 
business concerned “white people incroaching on their lands.”199  Indeed, in 
asking that Sconetoyah state his “business to Congress,” Washington 
provided an opportunity for a public presentation.  Sconetoyah’s response 
emphasized the Cherokee Nation’s insistence on retaining “their land.”200  
The problem was therefore simple:  “white people incroaching.”201  In 
response, not only did Washington shake Sconetoyah’s hand, but he “wished 
him great success in his business”—suggesting approval of his mission.202  
Indeed, Washington’s wishes for a “safe return” and to “find all his people 
well” may have been gesturing at the white racial violence against the 
Cherokee that spring.203  The performance of the handshake between 
Sconetoyah and Washington appeared to be a confirmation of the Hopewell 
Treaty’s promises to respect Native Nation land. 
This dramatic public meeting constituted only the most public of the 
meetings between Sconetoyah and Convention members and congressional 
delegates.  The newspaper noted, “Since he arrived in this city, there has been 
every mark of friendship shewn to him, and he has frequently had the honor 
to dine with several of the Members of Congress and Convention.”204  
Another key meeting occurred between Sconetoyah and Virginia governor 
Edmund Randolph.  According to Randolph, the “Cherokee chief” came with 
an interpreter to meet him.205  Either the chief or the interpreter “urged” 
Randolph to “send a talk and a present.”206  With his usual fretfulness over 
the boundaries of his authority, Randolph explained that he “could not 
refuse.”207  He sent a silver pipe “with some symbols of Virginia and 
Cherokee friendship.”208  Patronizingly, Randolph described the pipe as “an 
ornament to the townhouse of the Indians” and a medal to “conciliate the 
chief.”209  In addition, Randolph apparently sent back talks.210  Presumably, 
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Randolph sought to reassure the Cherokee Nation that his state would respect 
the Hopewell Treaty. 
In some newspaper accounts of Washington’s handshake and the 
conversation, the report appeared in sections discussing the Convention.211  
Considerable reprinting occurred over the summer.212  On September 8, 
1787, even the Georgia Gazette published the handshake account underneath 
a notice that the Convention was nearing completion of its work.213  
Although Sconetoyah never set foot inside the Convention, his visit was 
interwoven with the work of the Convention. 
C.  Compelling Observance of Treaties 
In the immediate wake of the handshake, the New Jersey delegates drafted 
an alternative plan to the Committee Report.214  The New Jersey Plan 
proposed a model more closely aligned with specific problems arising under 
the Articles.  Yet as with the Virginia Plan, the New Jersey Plan guaranteed 
the general government’s authority with respect to Native Nations.  Acts of 
the United States in Congress made in the past (under the Articles) and future 
were “supreme law of the respective States.”215  The New Jersey Plan 
incorporated the concern that treaty authority be affirmed and made explicit:  
“all Treaties made & ratified under the authority” of the United States were 
supreme law.216  Congress was given broad power to “pass Acts for the 
regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign nations as with each 
other.”217  And importantly, the federal judiciary was given jurisdiction in 
cases “in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any 
of the Acts for regulation of trade.”218  This approach shifted disputes over 
treaties and trade to the federal judiciary.  By specifying a federal judicial 
arbiter, the New Jersey Plan sought to bar North Carolina and Georgia from 
judging their own authority. 
Strikingly, the New Jersey Plan authorized national enforcement to stop 
white encroachment.  Article 6 addressed situations where a state “or any 
body of men in any State” opposed or prevented “carrying into execution” 
acts or treaties.219  In such a situation, the “federal Executive” was authorized 
to “call forth the power of the Confederated States.”220  The aim was to 
“enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts, or an Observance of such 
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Treaties.”221  Observance of treaties was to be compelled through a new 
enforcement mechanism.222 
The delegates instantly grasped this difference regarding enforcement 
between the two plans.  As New York delegate Robert Yates noted, the New 
Jersey Plan gave “power to the executive to compel obedience by force,” as 
opposed to merely negativing a state law.223  Massachusetts delegate Rufus 
King’s summary made the use of force almost a duty when faced with treaty 
opposition, stating, “The Acts Treaties &c &c to be paramount to State Laws 
and when any State or body of men opposed Treaties or general Laws, the 
Executive to call forth the force of the Union to enforce the Treaty or 
Law.”224  James Wilson described the provision as “[t]he Right to call out 
the force of the Union.”225  As Rufus King’s summary underscored, 
compelled observance extended to any “body of men”—a phrase that likely 
brought to mind settlements such as the State of Franklin.226  Moreover, the 
New Jersey Plan removed the decision about the use of compelled force from 
Congress.  The executive became the decision maker over treaty 
enforcement.  In the context of the demands of the Native Nations that the 
Hopewell Treaties be honored and white encroachment ended, the New 
Jersey Plan suggested willingness to use the general government’s military 
power on the side of Native Nations and against white settlers if necessary.  
As North Carolina governor Alexander Martin had recognized earlier that 
spring with respect to the Franklin settlers, “nothing will Remove them but 
an armed Force.”227 
Alexander Hamilton’s lengthy speech on Monday, June 18 echoed the 
robust treaty-focused stance of the New Jersey Plan.  The executive and the 
Senate would have the “power of making all treaties,” Hamilton declared, 
and they would control the departments on war and foreign affairs, as well as 
nominate ambassadors to foreign nations.228  Contrary state laws were to be 
“utterly void” and state governors would be appointed by the “general 
Government.”229  Similarly, state militias were to be controlled by the 
general government, with their officers also appointed by the general 
government.230  In short, Hamilton recommended an approach similar to that 
of the British government. 
It is likely that even as Hamilton gave his speech, Tobocah, the Queen, and 
Muckleshamingo arrived in Philadelphia.  Along with Dromgoole, they 
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stayed at the Cross Keys Inn until July 5.231  They too intended to ensure an 
end to white encroachment.  As the newspapers noted, they had been 
“appointed to see the articles of the treaty made at Hopewel Senaca, in the 
state of South Carolina, by the representatives of their nations and the 
commissioners of the United States, ratified and made good.”232  
Immediately upon their arrival, they wrote Benjamin Franklin requesting his 
assistance and “Directions to proceed to their Business.”233 
Inside the Convention, James Madison seemed to reference the presence 
of four members of Native Nations the very next day.  On June 19, Madison 
gave the only speech that scholars identify as explicitly referring to the 
“Indians,” in the course of his argument seeking approval of the Committee’s 
Report.234  Worried perhaps that the New Jersey and Hamilton plans might 
create the impression that the Committee Report was sympathetic to white 
encroachment, Madison firmly condemned “encroachments on the federal 
authority.”235  His use of the word “encroachments” cleverly connoted 
jurisdictional violations of the general government’s authority in any number 
of cases, while also hinting at the specific instance of physical encroachments 
of Native Nation territory protected under the general government’s treaty 
authority.  Madison more explicitly referenced exclusive congressional 
authority over matters relating to Native Nations.  He stated, “By the federal 
articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs.”236  Even without 
expansion of congressional jurisdiction, Madison insisted that Congress 
controlled under the existing Articles.237  In brief, Congress had full and 
complete authority in relations with Native Nations. 
Madison condemned state violations of treaties and singled out Georgia.  
As he explained, “Yet in several instances, the States have entered into 
treaties & wars with them.”238  Robert Yates recalled Madison’s statement 
of the problem more dramatically.  He said that the “confederated states” had 
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“power” (meaning capacity) “to violate treaties.”239  Yates recollected, “Has 
not Georgia, in direct violation of the confederation made war with the 
Indians, and concluded treaties?”240  According to King, Madison had 
forcefully denounced Georgia’s illegitimate interpretation that “Georgia has 
declared & prosecuted a war agt. the Indians—they have treated with 
them.”241  The word “treated” was the verb to form a treaty—and Madison 
left no doubt that Georgia’s actions in treating and declaring war were 
illegitimate under the Articles.  The Committee Report only reinforced that 
exclusion. 
Cleverly, Madison then played on fears that white settlers’ encroachment 
would lead to an Indian war.  He warned about a future in which the Franklin 
or Kentucky settlers achieved statehood.  If the New Jersey Plan were 
adopted, the “prospect of many new States to the Westward”—each with an 
equal vote—would create “a more objectionable minority than ever might 
give law to the whole.”242  Allowed to create a state “minority” voting bloc, 
white settlers in western territories would bring the nation to the brink of war 
with Native Nations.243 
Beyond establishing that every plan affirmed exclusive general 
government treaty authority, the visits by the Native Nations deputies 
apparently focused Madison’s thinking about the United States as a 
confederation.  They suggested that if the United States breached the 
Hopewell Treaties and failed to repair the relationship, then Native Nations 
would turn to Spain.  Madison’s June 19 speech noted that, according to the 
“Expositors of the law of Nations,” a breach of any one article by a part leaves 
people to consider it “dissolved”—that is, “unless they choose rather to 
compel the delinquent party to repair the breach.”244  From this principle, 
Madison drew the further conclusion that the United States should not be 
analogized to a confederation.245  If the states imagined themselves as 
sovereign, then they too could threaten to align with Spain.  (One wonders if 
Madison had heard rumors to that effect.)  With the conclusion of Madison’s 
speech, the delegates voted on the Committee Report.  Although New Jersey, 
Delaware, and New York dissented, the other delegations voted in favor.246 
D.  The Friendship and Justice of the United States 
While the Convention completed these deliberations, three significant 
political figures in Indian affairs left New York for Philadelphia.  Secretary 
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at War Henry Knox arrived around June 14 or 15 and left around June 30.247  
North Carolina representative William Blount took his seat at the Convention 
on June 20.248  And, accompanying Blount was his fellow North Carolina 
congressional delegate and Hopewell Treaties commissioner Benjamin 
Hawkins.249  Although Hawkins initially intended to continue south after 
reaching Philadelphia, by early July, he and Blount returned to New York to 
give Congress an unanticipated quorum.  The Native Nations’ presence in 
Philadelphia raised concerns with the Spanish envoy, Diego de Gardoqui.  By 
June 22, he was relaying this information to relevant Spanish officials in 
Louisiana and, before the Convention adjourned, he would himself journey 
to Philadelphia.250 
For the two North Carolina representatives, the deputies’ visits confirmed 
the problem of treaty infractions by whites.  According to Blount, the 
Cherokee Nation deputy “complained loudly against the infractions of the 
Treaty at Hopewell in as much as that the whites had settled with in a few 
miles of their towns and within that part assigned them by the State of 
N.Ca.”251  Blount added, “I could wish the whites had for born their 
settlements on that part.”252  For Hawkins, the white encroachments betrayed 
the Hopewell Treaty.  Hawkins explained to Jefferson that the Treaties 
showed “how attentive I have been to the rights of these people” and that 
there was “nothing I have more at heart than the preservation of them.”253 
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Once in Philadelphia, Henry Knox, representing Congress as the secretary 
at war, met with the Native Nations deputies.  The nature and timing of his 
meetings are not known.  In their wake, however, Knox composed formal 
letters to the kings of the Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations on Wednesday, 
June 27.254  Each letter began acknowledging receipt of the talk sent to 
Congress and apologized that the “great Council of the United States” was 
not then assembled.255  Knox promised, however, once they did assemble, he 
would submit the talks and obtain an answer.256 
In his official capacity, Knox pledged the United States to the Treaty 
relationships.  He formally sent “A Message from the Secretary at War of the 
United States . . . in answer to his Message to Congress.”257  And he carefully 
constructed the letters to demonstrate the equality between the United States 
and the Nations; he repeatedly used the words “brother” and “Nation.”258  To 
the Chickasaw Nation, Knox wrote, “Let your Nation keep the Chain of 
friendship fast with the right hand.”259  They could “depend” that John White 
as superintendent would “hold fast” the other end “on the part of the United 
States.”260  Knox promised that White would “take care that all the 
Boundaries are preserved agreeably to the Treaties.”261  Indeed, Congress 
will “embrace every occasion to convince you how sincerely disposed they 
are to preserve all treaties that have or shall be made with you.”262  To the 
Choctaw Nation, Knox noted that they could “depend on the friendship of 
the United States.”263  The pledges were official commitments.264 
Knox promised U.S. medals and gifts as evidence.  Medals had become a 
visible pledge of allegiance, so much so that the Spanish governor in New 
Orleans had threatened to stop trade unless the Native Nations that “wear 
British medals” exchanged them for Spanish medals.265  Knox planned to 
send “great & small Medals” for their “great Warriors” and “great men of 
your Nation” and also “Colour”—flags—for the towns.266  The gifts were 
“evidence of the friendship of the United States” and the nation’s “good 
disposition.”267 
A similar message was conveyed by Benjamin Franklin, the most 
important American in Philadelphia other than Washington, when Franklin 
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met with the deputies.  As the Choctaw Nation resided “far asunder,” 
Franklin said, he had never had “the Pleasure before to see a Man of your 
Nation.”268  Confirming Knox’s message that Congress was not meeting, 
Franklin promised that as Tobocah had not been able to do his “Business 
there,” Congress in the future would take “your Nation into Consideration” 
and give “Satisfaction[,] Brother”269  He gave Tobocah a personal letter with 
a pledge of protection because “Mr. Woods and the Indians under his Care” 
had come “from far distant and friendly Nations on public Business.”270  And 
he ordered gifts from Pennsylvania, including a gorget with the Pennsylvania 
arms and calico for the Queen.271  His repetition of “Nations” and “Brother” 
underscored Native Nation sovereignty. 
With these assurances, Knox and Franklin induced Tobocah and 
Muckleshamingo to return home.  The pledges of the Treaty relationship 
were intended to persuade the deputies to bypass New York.  To this end, 
Knox agreed to have the United States cover the expenses of the return 
journey.272  And Knox attempted to prevent future unexpected visits by 
encouraging them to deal with the superintendent, thereby avoiding “the 
trouble of sending any of your own people to so great a Distance.”273 
Sconetoyah, however, remained unhappy.  Franklin sought to reassure him 
that justice would be done.  As Franklin noted, however, Sconetoyah was 
“going back, apparently dissatisfied, that our General Government is not just 
now in a Situation to render them Justice.”274  Franklin added that the 
discontent would “tend to increase Ill Humor in that Nation.”275  Sconetoyah 
also may have met with Knox because Knox requested the purchase of a 
horse for “the Cherokee Chief.”276  In addition to or in lieu of such a meeting, 
Franklin met Sconetoyah and drafted letters hastening to reassure that 
“Justice will be done to your Nation.”277  Franklin grasped that the 
fundamental issue was that “the white People encroach on your Lands, 
contrary to Treaty.”278  Franklin “assured” Old Tassel that, when Congress 
convened in a few months, the Native Nations’ complaints would be 
addressed.  As a token of his pledge, Franklin sent a silver medal.279  
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Separately, Franklin wrote to “the Cherokee Indian Queen.”  Referring to 
Katteuha as “Sister,” he praised her letter to Congress as evidence of her 
“Prudence and Wisdom, and your Love of Peace.”280  Franklin promised that 
once Congress met, “Justice will be done.”281  Signing himself “Your loving 
Brother,” Franklin gave Sconetoyah a medal and sent a picture of himself in 
silver for Katteuha.282 
Although unauthorized white encroachment threatened an Indian war and 
Congress was obliged and committed to uphold the Treaty relationship, 
Franklin thought there was a path forward for future white settlement.  He 
immediately wrote to John Sevier suggesting that he avoid “an Indian War 
by preventing encroachments on their Lands.”283  Instead, Franklin 
recommended purchasing land as “these People” usually gave “very good 
Bargains.”284  A war would result in larger losses than if white settlers were 
to fairly buy lands that the Cherokee could “spare.”285  Franklin warned 
Sevier:  “It may be well however to acquaint those Encroachers that the 
Congress will not justifie them in the Breach of a solemn Treaty.”286  Indeed, 
the general government would not support the settlers if they brought a war 
“upon themselves.”287  Congress would uphold the Treaties. 
Reassured by Knox and Franklin that Congress would do justice and would 
uphold the Treaty relationship, as well as stop white encroachment, the four 
deputies left Philadelphia:  Sconetonayah on July 1 or 2 and the others around 
July 5.288  The United States covered the cost of transportation to Fort Pitt 
for Tobocah, the Queen, and Muckleshamingo.289  From Fort Pitt, possibly 
by flatboat, the delegation turned toward home.  Sconetoyah returned to 
Chota in early September.290  Old Tassel and Hanging Maw received the 
medals and silver gorgets; Katteuha, the Beloved Woman, received 
Franklin’s picture in silver, a silver hairplate and ear bobs.291  Randolph’s 
silver pipe was smoked—and apparently enjoyed most of all.292  The U.S. 
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flag now flew in the Cherokee Nation.293  Katteuha sent back to Franklin a 
talk and tobacco, hoping that “you & your Beloved men will smoke it in 
Friendship.”294  She asked that her talk be placed on the “white stool in 
Congress” and that a “beloved woman amongst you . . . will help to put her 
Children Right if they do wrong.”295  She hoped that messengers “shall go & 
come in safety Between us.”296 
IV.  THE CHAIN OF FRIENDSHIP 
The departure of the deputies created a space in which three striking 
developments occurred.  First, Congress met and passed the Northwest 
Ordinance.  Second, Secretary at War Henry Knox prepared a report on the 
Native Nations establishing the beginning of the Indian affairs policy that 
characterized the Washington administration.  Third, the Convention passed 
the Supremacy Clause, thereby avoiding a debate over control by a negative 
or military force.  Only in the final weeks did concerns about possible 
linguistic caviling result in the additional inclusion of the so-called Indian 
Commerce Clause.  I sketch here how each of these developments resulted 
from the visits. 
A.  Congress 
Although Knox and Franklin informed the Native Nations deputies that 
Congress was not meeting, shortly thereafter, Congress reconvened.  Its main 
piece of business was the passage of the Northwest Ordinance.297  Was it 
coincidence that Congress—hitherto assumed to have adjourned until after 
the Convention—hurried back in session?  Despite what Knox told the 
Native Nations deputies, he was an investor in the Ohio Company and may 
have been an instigator of the new quorum.  Was the quorum driven by 
southern representatives like Blount, who had investment interests in plans 
for white settled southern territories?  In any event, key Convention delegates 
raced to New York.  Georgia and North Carolina delegates Blount, William 
Few, and William Pierce also traveled back after July 2.298  Hawkins 
similarly turned around, abandoning his plans to return to North Carolina.299  
And Knox also returned to New York.300  On July 9, Congress achieved a 
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quorum when Richard Henry Lee of Virginia presented his credentials after 
having spent approximately a week in Philadelphia.301 
Reconsidering the Northwest Ordinance’s passage in light of the visit of 
the four deputies and the desire of Knox and others to stop them from 
reaching Congress, the passage may now be seen in a far more troubling light.  
Had the southern Native Nations arrived in New York in early July, the 
ordinance would have been entangled in explicit claims of the Treaties’ 
violations and white encroachment.  The idea of creating a blueprint for 
temporary government of the western territories would have been in obvious 
conflict with the underlying and inevitable expropriation of land.  Moreover, 
warriors from the Oneida Nation were already in New York; indeed, Knox 
had been paying for their lodging and board.302  They complained about the 
disorganization of the “indian department” and expressed their disagreement 
over personnel.303  The southern deputies would have overlapped with the 
Oneida warriors.  New York then probably would have become a meeting 
place for furthering a Native Nation Confederation, encompassing northern 
and southern Nations.  For Knox, concerned personally with the Ohio 
Company and professionally with avoiding an Indian war, preventing such a 
meeting may have seemed of critical importance. 
In early July, the proposed western ordinance offered a blueprint for 
occupation of territories.304  In it there were two references to Native Nations.  
The first explicitly mentioned the extinguishment of Indian title.  The 
territorial governor was given authority to “make proper division . . . [and] 
lay out the parts of the district in which the Indian titles shall have been 
extinguished, into counties and townships.”305  The second longer section 
embraced the treaty relationship, insisting on good faith and friendship 
toward Native Nations.306  It recognized “their lands and property” and 
required “their consent” for land and property transfers: 
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their 
lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent; 
and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded or 
disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorised by Congress; but laws 
founded in justice and humanity shall from time to time be made, for 
preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving peace and 
friendship with them.307 
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Yet, nowhere in this document was there incorporation of the explicit 
boundaries of Native Nations, as agreed to under treaties.  That is, the 
Indians’ land was something seemingly ephemeral and contingent; indeed, 
in place of guaranteeing established boundaries, the ordinance delineated 
legal modes of dispossession.  Conversely, the ordinance explicitly provided 
a path for white settlement.  With 5000 “free male inhabitants,” a territory 
acquired a legislature.308  Property ownership and a short two-year residency 
afforded voting rights.309  The legislature was authorized to send a 
“[d]elegate to Congress, who shall have a seat in Congress, with a right of 
debating, but not of voting, during this temporary Government.”310  On 
reaching 60,000 free inhabitants, the temporary government became a state 
admitted on “equal footing with the original States.”311  Significantly, the 
ordinance explicitly drew the boundaries of the states—noting that they were 
unalterable once Virginia completed its cession of territory.312  Despite 
recognizing Indian title and lands, the ordinance predicted the rise of future 
states and rendered invisible Native Nations.313 
The speed with which the ordinance passed, and the addition of the 
antislavery clause, with southerners suddenly “favorably disposed,” has long 
intrigued historians.314  On July 9, the report on the ordinance—postponed 
since May 10—moved forward.315  A revision limited the application of the 
ordinance to the northwest section of the territory above the Ohio River.316  
With the change, the ordinance suddenly only addressed the northern section, 
divided in the same manner as the recent superintendency of Indian affairs.  
The third reading occurred on July 12, and the next day, Congress approved 
what became known as the Northwest Ordinance.317  In the final version on 
July 13, the ordinance included a new article barring slavery, yet nonetheless 
requiring the return of enslaved fugitives.318  New Yorker Abraham Yates 
was the sole dissenting vote.319  As prior historians have suggested, Yates 
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may have written anonymous articles “opposing the expropriation of Indian 
land” and his dissent could have arisen from this concern.320 
It was largely white territorial expropriation that motivated the Northwest 
Ordinance.  That an antislavery provision emerged may have been something 
of an ironic fortuity or a silent bargain to temper the concerns of any 
antislavery advocates also worried about Native Nation expropriation.  For 
northerners with investments in the Ohio Company, the Northwest Ordinance 
suggested that Congress would not oppose white settlement and would ignore 
requests by northern Native Nations to halt surveys.  For southerners hoping 
to invest in or to occupy the western claims of Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Georgia, the Northwest Ordinance seemed to offer a guarantee that, if the 
states completed cession of the territories, white settlement could continue. 
At the end of the month, Edward Carrington, a Virginia congressional 
delegate, linked the new northwestern territorial plan to the apparent growing 
Indian Confederacy, as part of a policy of treaties in the face of possible war.  
After describing the new scheme for the western territory, Carrington 
explained that “Indian affairs wear an hostile aspect” and warned that a 
“general confederacy” was being formed.321  As a lot of money would be 
required for a war, Carrington argued, it would be “better to spend a little 
money in Treating.”322  Turning to hostilities in Kentucky, Carrington again 
suggested proceeding by treaty.323  As he noted, “[t]he state of the general 
confederacy requires some care in the direction of this business.”324  The rise 
of a united Indian Confederacy forced on the United States a choice:  treaties 
under which white settlement would be based on purchase or an Indian 
war.325 
B.  Secretary at War Report 
With the ordinance’s passage achieved, Knox contemplated the 
repercussions of the Native Nations visits.  The expenses of the visits, and 
more broadly the power that the deputies had wielded by appearing in person, 
focused his concerns.  In addition, Knox worried about the continued effort 
by Georgia and North Carolina to claim authority over Native Nations and to 
encourage white settlement in lands protected by the Hopewell Treaties.  
First Knox sought the departure of the Oneida warriors; as he put it in his 
report, “it is the wisest mode to dismiss these people in a civil manner as soon 
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as possible.”326  Agreeing to send powder, lead, and paper, Knox planned to 
“return them immediately to their own country.”327 
With respect to the Philadelphia visits, Knox worked quickly to achieve 
approval of expenses, operating as if the “Indian chiefs” had reached 
Congress.328  Nonetheless, the Board of Treasury warned against future 
expenses, as monies from general requisitions “scarcely support the expences 
of the Civil Government.”329  The board worried that visits “by Indians of 
different Tribes to the Seat of Congress” were accompanied by “very 
considerable and unnecessary expense” and might increase.330  The board 
and Congress agreed that “all communications to the United States in 
Congress” occur “through” the superintendents of Indian affairs.331  And the 
resolutions penalized any person serving as a conductor without permission 
by making such a person responsible for expenses and permanently forfeiting 
his license to trade.332 
That same day, July 18, Congress read the secretary at war’s report relating 
to the southern Indians.333  As a congressional appointee, Knox treated his 
meetings with the Native Nations deputies as if they had met with Congress.  
Congress had “received strong complaints from the said Indians” and 
“requests for redress.”334  The visits had clarified Knox’s thinking.  His report 
emphasized the fundamental concerns:  first, “certain encroachments on the 
lands claimed by said Indians,” and second, the likelihood of war arising 
from Georgia’s dispute with the Creek Nation.335  The difficulty for Congress 
arose from “state constructions” of the powers “regulating the trade and 
managing all affairs” in the Articles.336  The state’s interpretation of the 
carveout made any “interference of the United States” difficult.337  For Knox, 
the problem arose from Georgia’s interpretation of the Articles’ phrase.  
Moreover, Knox foresaw the rise of a general confederacy of Indians to the 
south parallel to the general confederacy already existing of “nearly all the 
indians” north of the Ohio.338  Knox warned against underestimating Joseph 
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Brandt, the head of the northern Confederacy, because he was a “man of great 
influence and reputed abilities.”339 
Ever the pragmatist, Knox saw only one solution to which the southern 
states would “be acceded to” regarding territorial disputes between the 
independent tribes and the western settlers of North Carolina and Georgia.340  
If North Carolina and Georgia ceded the lands involved, the United States 
could then “be powerfully enabled to restrain the indians within due 
bounds.”341  Although Knox implied acceptance by the general government 
of white settlement in the western territory, he explicitly condemned the 
North Carolina encroachments.  The North Carolina legislature should be 
“forcibly” informed that their repeal of the prior 1784 cession “involved the 
United States as a Sovereign nation in the deepest disgrace and 
humiliation.”342  The Hopewell Treaty had been “flagrantly violated by the 
usurpation of the lands assigned by the said treaty as the hunting grounds of 
the Cherokees.”343  Likewise, with respect to the Chickasaw and Choctaw 
Nations’ concerns, the “treaty and the expectations” of being “supplied with 
goods” should be “fully complied with.”344  Finally, to attach the “minds and 
affections” of the “Southern and Northern tribes of indians,” Knox 
recommended sending medals, gorgets, and wristbands and armbands 
engraved with the arms of the United States.345  The plan would subvert 
Spanish efforts to exchange British medals for their own and would represent 
allegiance to the United States.346 
Implicitly addressing the Convention, Knox warned of an inevitable Indian 
war unless the United States “in reality possess the power.”347  The power to 
which Knox referred was, as he put it, “‘to manage all affairs with the 
independent tribes of indians’ to observe and enforce all treaties made by the 
authority of the union.”348  The words that Knox placed in quotations 
interestingly were not the literal words of the Articles.  Knox’s version 
acknowledging “independent tribes”—rather than the Articles’ “Indians”—
suggested the modern “Native Nations.”  Moreover, Knox’s description of 
the power omitted the carveout and substituted instead the relationship 
embodied by and through an expansive embrace of treaties:  managing affairs 
with the independent tribes to observe and enforce all treaties.  Knox’s 
message to the Convention was clear:  reconfirm the general government’s 
treaty authority and omit the convoluted carveout; indeed, ensure that the 
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language barring the states was impossible to parse semantically.349  Indeed, 
several weeks later at the Philadelphia Convention, James Madison tried to 
address Knox’s concern.350 
In Congress, Knox’s report was not immediately adopted but pressure on 
Congress continued.  Indeed, one day later, William Blount wrote to the 
North Carolina governor that Congress had received a letter “in the Indian 
Language” from Joseph Brandt “informing that all the Nations of Indians” 
northwest of the Ohio had “formed a Confederacy offensive & 
Defensive.”351  The Confederacy demanded that the United States stop 
surveying.  Furthermore, reports from Kentucky stated that “the Indians are 
hostile on that quarter” and that the Creek would soon start “hostilities” with 
“the Citizens of Georgia.”352  On July 21, Yates demanded a voice count of 
individual members as Congress continued consideration of Knox’s 
report.353  Finally, on July 23, Hawkins secured approval for at least medals 
and gorgets.354 
Within Congress, some delegates favored Native Nations and promoted 
the general government’s exclusive treaty authority.  In late July, Georgia’s 
congressional delegates were rebuffed in their effort to have Congress aid the 
state against the Creek Nation.355  This committee report blamed 
encroachment—“[a]n avaricious disposition in some of our people to acquire 
large tracts of land and often by unfair means”—as the “principal source of 
difficulties with the Indians.”356  The Indians had “just claims to all lands 
occupied by and not fairly purchased from them.”357  Rejecting the 
“construction” of the carveout, the committee report declared it “by no means 
the true one.”358  The general government’s power of “forming treaties or 
managing Affairs with the Indians” had long been accepted.359  As the tribes 
were “common friends or enemies” of the entire United States, “no particular 
state” could have the “exclusive interest” in managing Indian affairs.360  
Powers in “managing affairs with them” were “indivisible,” given entirely to 
the Union or to the states.361  This dramatic language, however, never made 
it beyond the committee.  As Gregory Ablavsky points out, Georgia was able 
to defeat a supermajority in support of the report.362 
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Later that summer, yet another committee recommended that U.S. policy 
regarding Native Nations move toward greater equality and thus aspire to a 
general treaty.363  The idea of a general treaty seemed to respond to the earlier 
advocacy of the northern Native Nations and also represented an elaboration 
of the similarities of the three Hopewell Treaties.  In a wide-ranging report, 
the committee of Indian affairs declared, “Instead of a language of superiority 
and command; may it not be politic and Just to treat with the Indians more 
on a footing of equality . . . ?”364  And it favored purchase:  “the principle of 
fairly purchasing of them and taking the usual deeds.”365  Congress acted on 
the report in October.366 
The following May 1788, Knox wrote one more report, building on the 
principles articulated since the visits of the deputies.  Emphasizing the 
northern Confederation’s opposition to white settlement, he pointed out that 
they “have expressed the highest disgust, at the principle of conquest.”367  
Instead of conquest, Knox proclaimed that the United States should adopt the 
policy of purchase.368  As Robert Clinton writes, “[t]his recommendation by 
Knox later became the cornerstone of federal Indian policy.”369  The visits 
had altered U.S. policy at the outset of the government under the new 
Constitution. 
C.  Convention 
Even as Knox finished drafting his initial report, the Convention ensured 
that the general government’s power regarding Native Nations was exclusive 
and, concomitantly, that state power was explicitly prohibited.370  On July 
17, the Convention approved broad congressional power and explicitly 
declared treaties to be supreme law.371  Notably, Georgia’s delegation 
opposed the explicit expansion of power for the “general interests of the 
Union, and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent.”372  
The delegates then replaced the negative on state law with the Supremacy 
Clause.  The clause came from the New Jersey Plan, where it had been paired 
with U.S. enforcement.  The pertinent language was:  “[A]ll Treaties . . . 
under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the 
respective States as far as those . . . Treaties shall relate to the said States, or 
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their Citizens and Inhabitants . . . .”373  The benefit of treaty supremacy was 
to extend not only to citizens but to a broader category of “Inhabitants.”374  
And the wording—explicitly linking treaties to states—prevented possible 
caviling about the application of the Hopewell Treaties. 
The draft by the Committee of Detail bolstered exclusive general 
government treaty power.  The legislature was given the power to “call forth 
the aid of the militia” to execute laws and “enforce treaties.”375  Immediately 
thereafter, the Supremacy Clause appeared as a stand-alone article.376  And 
a new article listed prohibitions on the states, including explicitly entering 
“into any treaty, alliance, or confederation.”377  This draft adopted the 
presumption within both the Virginia and New Jersey Plans that the United 
States government had authority with respect to Native Nations.  The 
contested language from the Articles of Confederation was omitted.378  The 
deputies’ presence in Philadelphia underscores that the absence of an 
enumerated power was neither inadvertent nor a deliberate omission.379  The 
general government had the power to form treaties and manage affairs with 
Native Nations. 
In Congress, however, Georgia and North Carolina continued to insist on 
state power to deal with Native Nations.  Over the course of the summer, 
Georgia had moved close to war with the Creek Nation.  On August 3, 
William Few of Georgia and William Blount (both also Convention 
delegates) introduced a congressional motion that Georgia and North 
Carolina, along with the superintendent of Indian affairs, deal with the Creek 
Nation.380  Later that fall, a Georgia legislative committee placed the blame 
for the state’s war with the Creek Nation on the “too sudden interferences” 
of the United States with state treaties that had suggested to the Indians that 
“another disposition” might be made of the territory than becoming part of 
the state.381  Georgia went to war against the Creek Nation in the fall.382 
At the Convention, as a recent member of the Indian affairs congressional 
committee, Madison was familiar with the semantic parsing of the Articles 
by the two states and the two states’ recent avowal.  On August 18, when the 
delegates reviewed the proposed congressional powers, Madison suggested 
additional language plausibly designed to bar the two states’ disputed 
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claims.383  Read in context, Madison’s proposal focused on the contested 
western territories, as of then not yet ceded by the southern states.  These 
territories were, of course, the lands of Native Nations, most recently 
confirmed under the Hopewell Treaties.  In proposing new enumerated 
powers beyond the implied powers of the general government, Madison’s 
first three examples dealt with western areas: 
1. to dispose of the unappropriated lands of the U.S.  2. To institute 
temporary Governments for new States arising thereon.  3. to regulate 
affairs with the Indians as well within as without the limits of the U. 
States.384 
Madison’s proposal seemed driven by the location of Indians—the odd 
phrase, “as well within as without the limits” of the United States.  What 
specifically the phrase referred to is uncertain.  Later that week, Madison 
expressed concern about possible wording that could be “liable to cavil.”385  
He was particularly worried about situations in which a future interpreter 
might narrow congressional authority because the draft language did not use 
explicit words of inclusion.386  Most delegates did not share Madison’s 
anxiety.  Nonetheless, Madison’s fretting over a hypothetical situation may 
have been the motivation for his idea of an additional enumerated power:  it 
would cover the lands expected to be ceded—but where cessions remained 
incomplete.  In short, “without the limits” could include the controversial 
territories technically still claimed by the southern states.  The continued 
congressional effort by Few and Blount may have led Madison to worry that 
the draft either needed to bar states explicitly from exercising authority even 
over land they claimed or that the United States needed to have its authority 
explicitly confirmed.  The purpose was to prevent a new semantic argument 
launched by Georgia and North Carolina.  This suggestion, along with several 
others, was referred back to the Committee of Detail.387 
When the committee returned a brief report, the report tried a similar but 
slightly different approach to address the concern that the two southern states 
would continue to insist on their own authority.  With the draft already 
explicitly prohibiting state treaty power, the committee turned to language 
relating to commerce.  They recommended adding to the general 
government’s existing power of commerce words that explained that 
Congress’s power extended to Indians, including where Native Nation land 
lay inside state claims.  The proposed language stated, “and with Indians, 
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within the Limits of any State, not subject to the laws thereof.”388  The 
wording again attempted to ensure that Georgia and North Carolina would 
be barred explicitly from claiming authority over commerce with the Indian 
tribes within either state’s claimed boundaries.389  The phrase resurrected the 
long-contested issue of the carveout; as with other controversial matters, it 
was referred to the Committee of Postponed Parts.390 
In September, perhaps to sidestep the controversy entirely, the committee 
crossed out the phrase “Limits of any State”391 and suggested the addition of 
the remaining words, “and with the Indian tribes.”392  Congressional power 
respecting commerce with the Indian tribes, broadly construed, extended 
without regard to geographic or jurisdictional boundaries.  The change 
clarified that power as to the Indian tribes lay with Congress regardless of 
state boundaries and unceded claimed lands. 
The final draft was striking in its absolute rejection of the position of 
Georgia and North Carolina under the Articles.  The treaty power lay in the 
general government—states were barred explicitly from making treaties.  
The Supremacy Clause applied to all treaties; indeed, the draft made clear 
that it applied retroactively to preexisting treaties, thereby encompassing the 
Hopewell Treaties.393  The militia could be called out to enforce treaties 
within states.394  And Congress had power to manage commerce with the 
Indian tribes within a state. 
One final, little-noticed change underscored the general government’s 
exclusive authority to deal with Native Nations.  On Wednesday, September 
12, the treaty prohibition lay buried in the list of exclusions in the draft of the 
Committee of Style and Arrangement.395  Article 1, section 10 excluded the 
states from a list of functions, beginning with coining money and ending with 
entering into any treaty or granting titles of nobility.396  On Friday, the 
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delegates reordered the section’s arrangement.397  The first words of section 
10 became, “No state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or 
confederation.”398  When the Convention adjourned the following Monday, 
the instrument appeared to have put an end to claims that the states had 
authority over Native Nations.  In theory, nothing stood in the way of 
Congress honoring the Treaties. 
Tobocah had begun his journey to Congress less than a year earlier in the 
belief that the Hopewell Treaties confirmed a constitutional relationship 
between the Native Nations and the United States.  He insisted that the United 
States uphold the Treaties and the larger relationship established at 
Hopewell.  Washington, Franklin, Knox, and others in Philadelphia shook 
the deputies’ hands and pledged to uphold the Treaties and to prevent 
encroachments.  Behind the scenes, some of them also made sure that the 
visits did not disrupt white expansion overseen by Congress, which included 
an enterprise in which some of them had personal investments.  But the visits 
influenced the written instrument, securing exclusive U.S. treaty authority 
and recognizing the capacity of Native Nations and Congress to honor and 
fulfill those treaty relationships—as the Native Nations had insisted. 
V.  BACK OF THE STATE HOUSE 
The influence of the visits lasted long after that summer of 1787.  The 
Northwest Ordinance opened a vast expanse for white settlement and 
furthered the removal of Native Nations.  In the southwest, as Knox 
predicted, states gradually ceded land to the United States.  South Carolina 
ceded the strip it claimed in August 1787, North Carolina in 1790, and the 
remainder after 1796.399  And long before any territories covered by the 
Northwest Ordinance became states, the areas contested in the summer of 
1787 did.  Kentucky became a state in 1792 and Tennessee in 1796, quickly 
followed by Ohio in 1803.  To the south, Spanish interest in supporting the 
Native Nations east of the Mississippi, which had been waning since 1795, 
slowly came to an end.400 
Despite the efforts to channel their visits through the superintendents, 
Native Nations visitors continued to arrive.  They dined with Washington, 
smoked the calumet pipe of peace, and offered speeches.  In 1789, a 
Cherokee agent went to New York.401  In 1792, approximately fifty Iroquois 
chiefs and warriors visited the capitol in Philadelphia, including Red Jacket 
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and Peter Otsiquette.402  Joseph Brant also visited in 1792.403  In 1793, 
Washington, Jefferson, Randolph, and Knox dined with six men and two 
women who represented the Kaskaskia, Peoria, Piankashaw, Potawatomi, 
and Mascouten Nations.404  A week later, Washington dined with chiefs from 
the Six Nations.405  In 1794, Washington met thirteen Cherokee chiefs.406  
And a month after that, he met another delegation from the Chickasaw 
Nation.407  In 1795, again in July, five Choctaw chiefs and three Chickasaw 
chiefs, along with an interpreter, visited Philadelphia.408  As had become 
customary, they met with Washington.409 
For Henry Knox, the visits still loomed large two years later.  In 1789, 
Knox recalled the visits in his key advisory memo for Washington.410  In 
reporting on the Chickasaw Nation, Knox noted: 
In the year 1787 they sent one of the Warriors of their nation to Congress 
to represent the distressed situation of the Cherokees, and that unless the 
encroachments of the Whites were restrained they should be obliged to join 
the Cherokees; and also to enforce the establishment of trade agreeably to 
the Treaty.411 
He similarly described the Choctaw Nation:  “[i]n the year 1787 they sent 
Tobocah, one of their great medal Chiefs to Congress, principally in order to 
solicit the establishment of trade” because distance had prevented “those 
encroachments which have been complained of by the Cherokees.”412  That 
memo, built on the foundation of the 1787 reports, went on to establish the 
boundaries of the Washington administration’s Indian policy.  As federal 
Indian law scholars note, the government embraced a “full international self-
determination model” after 1789.413  Knox explained to Washington that the 
“independent nations and tribes ought to be considered as foreign nations, 
not a subject of a particular state.”414 
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In the immediate aftermath, the two men who had served as conductors for 
the Native Nations deputies struggled financially.  After the visits, John 
Woods continued efforts to recover his expenses.  In December 1787, 
Congress paid “for his services and expences attending sundry Chiefs of the 
Choctaw Nation on a visit to Congress.”415  After further disputes with the 
Board of Treasury, Knox intervened in June 1788 and Congress authorized 
sufficient funds for Woods to “Journey homewards.”416  Alexander 
Dromgoole, the Cherokee Nation, and Sevier recommended him for the 
position of superintendent of Indian affairs, but Martin was appointed 
instead.417  In 1789, Dromgoole continued to carry talks between state 
officials and the Cherokee Nation, as well as the Creek and Chickamauga 
Nations.418  Thirty years later, Dromgoole curiously petitioned Congress in 
1823 for compensation related to “services rendered in the intercourse 
between the United States and the Cherokee Indians, in 1787.”419  What led 
to this belated effort is not apparent. 
In west Yazoo, Tobocah kept the gifts—the armbands, gorgets, sword, 
sash and, apparently, even spectacles—as evidence of his connections.420  
When Spanish official Stephen Minor visited in 1792, Tobocah showed him 
a small box containing portraits of George Washington and others.421  And 
he told the Natchez governor, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, that General 
Washington “treated him with great intimacy, having his house open at any 
hour and even recommending to him that he should frequent it often” in New 
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York.422  Tobocah may have even been among a group of Choctaw chiefs 
who visited Philadelphia in 1795.423 
As for Sconetoyah, I have found little.  Perhaps he led a long life, but he 
may have been murdered by a white militia member in 1788.  The claimed 
justification for the murder was retaliation for the murder of members of the 
Kirk family by Slim John, a Cherokee.424  The surviving member of the Kirk 
family, John Kirk, set off to retaliate, along with John Sevier and 150 
Franklin militia members.425  Despite a lack of evidence of more extensive 
Cherokee involvement, Sevier and his militia burned Cherokee towns and 
murdered inhabitants.426 
Reaching the Cherokee town of Chilhowee, Sevier’s forces surrounded the 
town where Old Tassel and Old Abraham were meeting in council.427  They 
were allegedly flying a flag—a U.S. flag given to them at Hopewell.428  The 
chiefs were told Sevier was on his way to meet with them and that the 
Franklin militia carried a white flag of truce.429  But it was all a lie.  With the 
chiefs inside the cabin, Kirk was permitted to enter and by tomahawk kill 
each man.430  In addition to the three chiefs—Old Tassel, Fool Warrior, and 
Old Abraham—Kirk murdered several other male relatives of the chiefs.  
One included a man sometimes described as Old Tassel’s son.431  That man 
might have been Sconetoyah.  In the aftermath, Sevier claimed to be a quarter 
mile away during the massacre.432  He then refused to prosecute Kirk.  
Congress offered resolutions condemning the act.433  Sevier was eventually 
prosecuted but found not guilty.434  War broke out and Martin ended up 
leading the forces against some of the Cherokee.435 
In the summer of 1794, Muckleshamingo returned to Philadelphia along 
with Piomingo to meet George Washington and Henry Knox.  Washington 
told them to “consider yourselves at home and take comfort accordingly,” 
and he promised that if they wanted to “go further and see the City of New 
York,” the secretary at war would make arrangements.436  In addition, 
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Washington was authorized to “employ such a number of Indians” to serve 
“against the hostile tribes northwest of the Ohio.”437  Washington appointed 
Muckleshamingo to the rank and pay of “Captain of the Militia.”438  The 
signed commission noted “having full confidence in the well tried friendship 
of Muckleshamingo a chief of the Chickasaw Nation.”439  Future president 
John Quincy Adams attended the reception.440 
Shortly thereafter, in 1800, William Birch published an engraving entitled, 
Back of the State House.  In the print, a group of men—members of Native 
Nations—walk across Independence Square in Philadelphia.  Talking in an 
animated fashion, they attract little attention from the white Philadelphia 
inhabitants strolling the grounds.  The perspective is from the front of 
Congress Hall—and the group seemingly is headed in that direction.  The 
print seemed to commemorate the long history of such visits.  Did the title 
Back of the State House suggest that Native Nations had been removed from 
the regular channels of governmental power or did it demonstrate the 
ubiquitous presence of Native Nations in U.S. governance?  Either way, the 
deputation occupied the center. 
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Figure 3. Back of the State House (close up)441 
 
CONCLUSION 
Congress’s relationship with Native Nations is older than the Constitution 
of 1787.  The Constitution further pledged to uphold that relationship.  
Restoring the deputies to Philadelphia makes it clear that their visits proved 
to be a catalyst that influenced the Convention and the general government.  
The visits by the deputies of the Native Nations highlight understandings 
between Congress and Native Nations that centered on treaties absorbed into, 
confirmed, and clarified by the written Constitution.  In 1787, the United 
States promised the deputies that it would uphold treaties, ensure justice, and 
preserve peace and friendship.  These 1787 visits marked the beginning of 
the Washington administration’s policy that presumed Native Nation 
sovereignty, pledged protection against white encroachment, and sought 
expansion through purchase as opposed to claimed conquest.  Yet the same 
visits also threatened to destabilize Congress’s effort to seize control of white 
encroachment and to convert it into a federally controlled process of 
establishing white inhabited states.  The visits thus also marked the beginning 
of efforts to discourage Native Nations from sending deputies to Congress.  
Although Native Nation leaders continued to appear to press claims, the 
failure to remember the 1787 visits created a space for Justice William 
Johnson’s effort in 1831 to deny that the Hopewell Treaties contained a right 
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to a deputy in Congress.  Recovering the visits of the deputies to Philadelphia 
in 1787 and the promises they received, including Washington’s handshake, 
suggests that the United States today should reaffirm the right and the 
importance of Native Nations sending deputies to Congress. 
